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Marriage, Motherhood and Masculinity in the Global Economy:
Reconfigurations of Personal and Economic Life 
Naila Kabeer
Summary
The different processes associated with globalisation have led to rising rates of paid
work by women often in contexts where male employment is stagnant or
declining. This paper explores how women and men are dealing with this femin-
isation of labour markets in the face of the widespread prevalence of male bread-
winner ideologies and the apparent threat to male authority represented by
women’s earnings.  Responses have varied across the world but there appears to be
a remarkable resistance to changes in the domestic division of unpaid work within
the household and a continuing failure on the part of policymakers to provide 
support for women’s care responsibilities, despite the growing importance of their
breadwinning roles. Many of the services previously provided on an unpaid basis are
being transferred to the paid economy but most working women continue to bear
a disproportionate burden of domestic responsibility. There is evidence that women
may be using their newly acquired earning power to challenge the injustice of the
double work burden in ways that pose a challenge to long-term processes of social
reproduction.
Keywords: gender, globalisation, feminisation of labour markets, migration, unpaid
work, motherhood, masculinity, family structures. 
Naila Kabeer is a Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies.
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Women stand at the crossroads between production and reproduction,
between economic activity and the care of human beings, and therefore
between economic growth and human development. They are workers in
both spheres – those most responsible and therefore with most at stake,
those who suffer most when the two spheres meet at cross-purposes, and
those most sensitive to the need for better integration between the two.
(Gita Sen 1995: 12)
The degree of globalisation and the degree of market integration have 
provided an economic and political context for the current changes in 
family/household relations that is quite unlike anything that has preceded it.
(Moore 1994: 5)
1 Introduction: the significance of 
‘work’ in the context of 
development
In a widely cited article at the end of the ‘first decade of development’, Dudley
Seers questioned the equation of development with economic growth and with
the failure of the dominant model of growth to generate the anticipated ‘trickle-
down benefits’ to the mass of the population of the third world (1969 and 1979).
Development, he argued, was a social phenomenon: the elimination of poverty,
unemployment and inequality were its central goals while economic growth was
one important means to achieve these goals. Employment had a special significance
for Seers. He saw it as essential for human beings to realise their full potential: the
denial of a recognised social role created chronic dependence for the basics of life
on the productive capacity of others, a dependence that was incompatible with
self-respect. Interestingly, he took this ‘recognised social role’ to extend beyond
paid work to include other productive but unpaid uses of time, such as study and
keeping house. While feminists have persistently sought to gain greater recognition
for the value of unpaid work within the home, the evidence presented later in the
paper questions whether such work does indeed diminish chronic dependence of all
those performing it. 
Seers was writing at a time in history when development was envisaged within
what Fraser (2005) refers to as the ‘Keynesian-Westphalian’ framework of planned
intervention within closed national economies. His basic insights remain relevant
today. While more explicit attention is being paid to poverty reduction in current
development discourses than was the case at the end of the sixties, poverty 
concerns remain confined within, and subordinated to, an overriding concern with
economic growth. And despite the greater stress on labour-intensive growth, the
nature of the jobs generated have failed to curb growing inequality in many parts
of the world (World Bank 2006; SAPRIN 2001; Cornia et al. 2004). 
However, the idea of development as state-led nation-building project appears
today as a vestige of a bygone era, overtaken by the widespread turn to market
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forces and the imperative for all countries to compete in a global economy. More
suited to contemporary reality is the work of Karl Polanyi (1944), who was also 
concerned with the social significance of employment but whose analysis was set in
the context of self-regulating markets very similar to those that prevail today.
Polanyi was dealing with the ‘great transformation’ wrought by the spread of
capitalist relations in the early years of industrialisation in Britain. He pointed to the
profound changes in human motivations and behaviour that occurred when markets
became disembedded from social relationships and took on a life of their own, 
governing rather than being governed by society. ‘Profit’ replaced reciprocity and
redistribution as the driving motor of productive endeavour, and forms of behaviour
based on ‘non-economic’ motivations of altruism, empathy, love and care were 
relegated to the rapidly shrinking non-market domain of the family. An important
contribution made by Polanyi’s work1 was the idea that the motivations and 
behaviour that predominated in a society reflected its dominant institutions rather
than embodying some universal set of values (Mayhew 2001).
The other important insight emerging from Polayni’s analysis related to the social
costs of treating human labour ‘as if’ it was just another commodity. A commodity
in a market-governed society was something that was bought and sold in the 
market place, and produced only for that purpose. Labour, he pointed out, was not a
commodity, except in a ‘fictive’ sense. It was the term applied to human beings in
so far as they were employed, rather than employers, and to their activities while
so employed. Such labour is however part and parcel of labourers themselves. It is
not produced for sale, but for entirely different reasons, nor can the activities it
embodies be detached from the person carrying it out to be stored or mobilised at
will. To reduce human beings to the status of commodities, relying entirely on their
price in the market place to ensure their own reproduction, was to condemn them
to perish from the effects of social exposure; ‘they would die as the victims of
acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation’ (p.73). 
Polanyi suggested that the threat that such a self-regulating market presented to
society gave rise to the need, indeed to the inevitability, of a counter-movement on
the part of society to protect itself from the naked logic of market forces. This
could take a variety of forms: the rise of trade unions and other organisations of
labour; the promotion of social welfare, the turn to protectionism or the passage
of protective legislation. The idea of a double movement – the expansion of
unregulated market forces, on the one hand, and their containment through social
protection measures on the other – has begun to feature with increasing regularity
in the writings of those concerned with the social implications of market 
deregulation at the present time (Standing 1999a; Munck 2002; Mott 2004;
Esping-Anderson 1990).  
However, neither Seers nor Polanyi paid a great deal of attention to the implica-
tions of gender for their analysis. While there was no reason why women could
not be part of the employment scenario of one and the commodification scenario
of the other, neither problematised gender inequality in the labour market and its
1 And one that gave rise to a major debate in anthropology between the formalists and the 
substantivists. 
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inter-connections with inequalities within the domestic economy. Nor have these
intersections been dealt with in any great detail in subsequent efforts to extend the
idea of the ‘great transformation’ to current processes of globalisation (see, 
however, Beneria 2003; Bakker 2003). Families appear to constitute a taken-for-
granted backdrop to the global economy in this literature, supplying labour,
demanding goods and acting as an informal safety net in times of crisis, but a realm
within which market principles do not apply, where social relationships continue to
be governed by principles of the ‘moral economy’ and where labour ceases to be a
commodity and recovers its human identity. 
Yet markets today not only operate on a scale that is unprecedented in history, they
also penetrate spheres of life that were once considered the antithesis of market
principles: the spheres of family, reproduction and the domestic economy. What
Polanyi had to say about the social consequences of the liberal market economy has
a great deal of bearing on the reconstitution of the boundaries between personal
and economic life that is taking place in the global economy today. The aim of this
paper is to address this gap by analysing these social consequences from an 
explicitly gender perspective. It takes as its point of departure the well-documented
increase in female labour force participation across the world, one aspect of the
global commodification of labour (Standing 1999a; Howes and Singh 1995; Mehra
and Gammage 1999; Kapsos 2005; Elder and Schmidt 2004). The factors behind
this ‘feminisation of labour’ have been well documented and are summarised
below. Less well documented are its implications for relationships within marriage
and family, particularly in the light of pervasive and deeply entrenched ideologies of
the male breadwinner. Yet if men are brought up, as they continue to be in so
many parts of the world, to take on the role of primary breadwinner for their
wives, children and other dependents, the process of adjusting to women’s grow-
ing capacity to earn must surely be a difficult, even painful, one. 
This is borne out by the empirical studies reviewed in this paper. The studies covered
use a variety of different methods and approaches and we have to rely on fuzzy
estimates of the behaviour of ‘most’ ‘many’ ‘some’ or ‘few’ men and women to
capture some of the trends they describe. But they relate a remarkably consistent
story. They remind us that the boundaries of households and families are not fixed
in perpetuity but fluid and responsive to changes in the wider economy and polity.
They suggest that family life has not remained untouched by the spread of market
relations and is undergoing its own more hidden transformations. And finally, given
the form that these transformations are taking, they suggest an emerging crisis in
social reproduction2 in many regions of the world. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I sketch out some of the main
factors behind both the feminisation of labour markets across the world as well as
the concentration of women workers in the more casualised segments of the 
global economy. Section 3 discusses the consequences of these processes of
commodification for women themselves and for their relationships with dominant
members of their families. It suggests that it is in the particular context of marriage
2 By social reproduction, I am referred to the processes by which life, capabilities and the
labour force are reproduced on a daily and generational basis.
that women’s entry into paid work has had the greatest repercussions but these
ramifications have spilt over into family relationships more generally. Sections 4 and
5 track some of the ways in which these ramifications have played out in the global
economy, generating new forces of supply and demand in the labour market as
well as further changes in the meanings and experiences of marriage, motherhood
and masculinity for different groups of men and women. Finally Section 6 draws
out some of the theoretical and policy challenges posed by the analysis. 
2 The globalisation of the economy 
in the twentieth century 
The twentieth century witnessed a major restructuring of the global economy, and
of the international division of labour, with profound implications for the lives, liveli-
hoods and life chances of people across the world. The century began with an
international division of labour that was largely shaped by colonial interests, with
the poorer countries exporting primary commodities to the rich while the latter
specialised in the production and export of manufactured goods. The post-war era
was a period of high rates of economic growth and full employment in the
advanced industrialised countries. It also saw the strengthening of state-provided
social protection for the majority of workers in these countries, giving rise to differ-
ent varieties of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Developing countries sought to ‘catch up’ through strategies of import-substitution
industrialisation, building up their manufacturing capacity behind protective barriers.
Many had inherited weak and highly restricted system of social protection from the
colonial era. While efforts were made to expand these measures to the wider pop-
ulation, the results were highly uneven. In most countries, social security measures
remained restricted to the civil service and the small, male-dominated section of
the workforce in formal public sector. The majority of men, and the vast majority of
women, were confined to earning a living or unpaid family labour in the informal
economy with virtually no statutory benefits and largely invisible to policymakers. 
Since the 1970s, a combination of factors set in train the processes that led to the
growing integration of the world’s economies and the resulting intensification in
flows of goods, services, people and ideas across national boundaries. These factors
included the rising costs of labour in advanced industrialised countries together with
rapid advances in information technology and transportation systems which allowed
production processes to be broken down and their labour-intensive stages relocated
to different regions of the world. However, politics has also played a major role in
driving the pace of globalisation. The ascendance of neoliberal ideologies, with its
celebration of free market forces, within some of the most powerful countries in
the world, led to the liberalisation of their economies and the weakening of their
welfare regimes, putting pressure on other advanced industrialised countries to do
the same. The influence of these ideologies within the international financial 
institutions ensured similar policies were pursued in indebted third world countries
through the conditionalities associated with structural adjustment lending as well as
in the transition from plan to market in the previously socialist countries. 
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The processes of globalisation has seen a doubling of trade as a share of global
income between 1970 and 2000 (ILO 2004). There has been a large increase in
flows and volatility of foreign capital. While official aid has declined in real terms,
private capital flows have increased from less than half of total resources flows in
developing countries in 1990 to about three-quarters in 2002. Surges in short-term
capital flows have been responsible for a great deal of the volatility but foreign
direct investments have also demonstrated considerable mobility, adding to the
insecurity of many countries. The increasing integration of financial markets has
meant that investment flows move together in response to the same events and
shocks, amplifying the effects of volatility.
Global competition has also influenced the pace and direction of change in the
productive economy. It has accelerated the secular decline in the share of
agriculture in national economies. Some of the older import-substituting domestic
industries which had grown up under the protective barriers of the earlier era have
been displaced while there has been rapid growth in the production of export-
oriented consumer goods and services, including garments, shoes, electronics, 
exotic foods, flowers, wines and tourism. 
Globalisation has led to some dramatic changes in the labour force. Along with a
steady expansion in the percentage of the population in paid work, there have been
important changes in the nature of paid work, the composition of the labour force
and its distribution between sites and sectors. There are two, interrelated aspects
of these changes in the labour market that are of particular interest for this paper. 
The first is the growing informalisation of work in the economies of many regions
(Chen et al. 2004; UNRISD 2005; Standing 1999a). This partly reflects reversals in
the formal economy and partly the rise of new forms of production. As far as
reversals are concerned, these were observed, for instance, in connection with the
downsizing of the public sector as a result of economic recession and structural
adjustment policies in many African and Latin American countries in the 1980s. They
were also observed in the previously centralised planned economies with the 
closure of state owned enterprises and the dismantling of formal social protection
measures, including the life-long employment guarantee. In all such contexts, there
was an expansion of informal activities as retrenched public employees sought work
in the informal economy while those still employed in the public sector tried to
bolster their declining salaries with informal work. 
In addition, the deregulation of financial markets and the liberalisation of trade
have increased the pressure on all countries to hone their competitive advantage in
the global economy through the promotion of more flexible labour markets.
Flexibility refers to the ease with which labour can be drawn in and expelled from
production in response to changing profitability considerations. The pursuit of
flexibility has led to a shift towards various ‘irregular’ employment relationships
which are not subject to the costs and obligations of more regularised relationships.
An increasing number of activities previously carried out within the formal economy
have been casualised and subcontracted to informal units while international 
outsourcing has given rise to global production chains with various stages of
production, and value-added, located in different sites across the world.
Competition in global markets has also led to the loss of jobs in domestic markets
as a result of import penetration. 
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The other change of interest here is the increased ‘feminisation’ of the global
labour force as a result of the steady rise in female labour force participation rates
since the 1970s in most regions of the world, with the exception of the transitional
economies in Eastern Europe and Central/Western Asia, where there have been
reversals, and the Middle East/North Africa region where they remain low
(UNRISD 2005). Women of all ages, married as well as unmarried, have entered
the labour market. The rise in female labour force participation has often been in
the context of stagnant and even declining rates of male labour force participation
so that women made up a larger share of the workforce in 1995 than they did in
1975 (see Table A1 in the Appendix). That this trend has continued is confirmed by
more recent estimates by Elder and Schmidt (2004) who note that female labour
force participation rates increased slightly between 1993–2003 while male labour
force participation rates declined. Economically active females per 100 males vary
between from the higher rates of 91 and 83 which prevailed in the transition
economies and East Asia respectively, to the lower rates of 36 and 44 which 
prevailed in the MENA region and South Asia. 
The feminisation of labour markets reflects a variety of interrelated factors. Rising
levels of education, declining family size, falling fertility rates and changing 
aspirations for themselves and their families together make it both possible and
desirable for women to take up paid work. In addition, women have been ‘pushed’
into the labour market by the decline in agricultural production and growing levels
of landlessness, the rising costs of living associated with the privatisation of public
welfare services and withdrawal of subsidies and declining levels of male employ-
ment and male wages as a result of the retrenchments associated with structural
adjustment programmes and the dismantling of state owned enterprises (UNRISD
2005; Chen et al. 2004). 
However, the phenomenon of feminisation is also a reflection of the informalisa-
tion of paid work and the changing nature of demand in the labour market.
Women have emerged as the flexible labour force par excellence for the highly
competitive labour intensive sectors of the global economy. There are a number of
reasons for this. First of all, they are generally free of the ‘fixed costs’ associated
with the largely male-dominated and organised labour force in what is now a
shrinking pool of formal employment. Secondly, ideologies of the male bread-win-
ner continue to justify their payment as ‘secondary earners’. And finally, gender
discrimination and segmented labour markets curtail their options and reduce the
reserve price of their labour. 
The process of feminisation has been accompanied by a shift in the sectoral 
distribution of female labour. Women have participated in the general movement
out of agriculture, but at a slower pace than men. They now make up an increasing
share of the manufacturing labour force, but it is the tertiary sector that has seen
the greatest rise in women’s share of the labour force (Mehra and Gammage 1999).
Despite these changes, however, gender hierarchies within the labour market
remain remarkably intact. Many more women may have entered the labour market
and many men joined women in insecure forms of work, but overall men continue
to enjoy a larger share of employment and earnings (UNDP 1995; Anker et al.
2003; Elder and Schmidt 2004; Arias 2001). 
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The feminisation of paid work has also been driven by rising levels of female 
migration, internal as well as international (UNFPA 2006). While cross border
migration in earlier decades was male dominated and flowed mainly from poorer
countries in the global south to wealthier countries in the north, both the sources,
destinations and composition of migration flows have diversified considerably. There
is now more migration within the global south itself as a response to uneven
development and disparities in income and opportunities within its different
regions. Women now make up around half of these flows, often migrating on their
own and outnumbering men in number of countries (e.g. Philippines, Indonesia, Sri
Lanka and a number of Caribbean countries). 
The flow of migrant labour has added to the flexibility of labour markets, acting as
a global reserve army for receiving countries, ‘a buffer to even out the swings of
the business cycle’ (The Strait Times, 17 November 1988, cited in Yeoh et al. 1999:
117). The flexibility of migrant labour lies in the fact that it too comes unencum-
bered by fixed costs and often on short-term contracts; it too has limited options in
the markets it is leaving behind but also in those into which it is migrating. In 
addition, the vulnerability of migrant labour is intensified by the prejudices of the
wider society of its host country and various markers of inequality, including gender,
ethnic minority status and ambiguous legality (Lim and Oishi 1996; Yeoh et al. 1999;
Dannecker 2005b; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003). While women working within
their own national contexts may not enjoy the formal rights to which they are
entitled, they nevertheless have access to certain resources in the form of families,
social networks, language ability and legal provisions, all of which give them a limit-
ed degree of room for manoeuvre in their negotiations around work (Robinson
1991). This is not the case for most low-skilled international migrants. 
The shifting movements of capital and labour across national boundaries have thus
served to internationalise and make more visible a hierarchical division of labour
that is structured along lines of class and gender but also race, ethnicity and 
geographical location. While the more educated women in higher growth
economies have moved into professional occupations, working class women in
these economies have moved into clerical and manufacturing jobs, leaving the less 
desirable form of work (dirty, difficult, dangerous and often demeaning) to 
members of socially excluded ethnic minorities, often migrants. 
Women’s workforce participation is clearly not a new phenomenon. In certain
regions of the world, and for certain groups within particular regions, women have
‘always’ worked, playing an active role in household productive activities along with
men. What is new is the increasing monetisation and diversification of women’s
activities so that women are increasingly included in estimates of paid economic
activity across the world, often in contexts in which men’s employment opportuni-
ties have stagnated or declined. Labour, including female labour, is becoming a
global resource even though the global market for labour remains hedged with
restrictions and controls. And while processes of globalisation have impacted on
structure of work opportunities for men and women in different parts of the
world, their responses to these opportunities have in turn shaped the forces of
demand and supply of labour in the global economy. The reconfigurations of market
forces and the processes of social reproduction are taking on an increasingly
transnational character. 
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3 The commodification of female 
labour in the local economy
3.1 The contradictory nature of the work experience for women
Views about the implications of women’s entry into paid work vary considerably.
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between optimistic and pessimistic readings of
this phenomenon. Although the causalities posited differ widely, the optimists
include those working in the tradition of Marx and Engels, modernisation theorists,
the World Bank and other mainstream development agencies as well as many fem-
inist researchers. A more gloomy prognosis, on the other hand, is offered by struc-
tural dependency theorists, neo-conservatives, critics of globalisation, as well as
many feminists. In an influential early article about the impact on women’s lives of
new economic opportunities in the global economy, Elson and Pearson (1981)
argued that (like other forms of social change), women’s experience of entry into
paid work was likely to be an essentially contradictory process, generating gains as
well as losses.3 However, their focus was, and has remained, on the more negative
aspects of this change (see Elson 1999; Pearson 2004). 
Yet even a preliminary reading of the plethora of empirical studies that have been
carried out on women’s entry into paid work in different contexts suggests that
we would do well to keep Elson and Pearson’s original insight in the foreground of
our analysis. These studies suggest that women’s experience of commodification,
whether working for domestic or global markets, has not only differed from that
of men but has varied for women themselves. It has also been far more contradic-
tory than Polanyi’s conceptualisation of the process would suggest. 
An important source of these contradiction relates to the fact that the large scale
entry of women into the paid labour force across the world, a new phenomenon
in many contexts, is occurring at a time when these labour markets are undergoing
the processes of informalisation – and that women tend to be concentrated in the
most casual and exploitative forms of work within this informalised economy. There
is a large body of empirical research which documents the unfavourable conditions
under which women have entered the labour market. It deals with their low
wages, long hours of work, insecurity of their jobs, irregularity of returns to work,
fines for ‘misdemeanours’, restricted toilet breaks, the stress of meeting deadlines,
the health hazards associated with many jobs, the monotonous nature of the work,
the long hours spent in the same position, the lack of respect shown by supervisors
and managers and the reproduction of gender hierarchies within work relationships
and in the wider economy (Ross 1997; Ong 1987; Siddiqi 1991; Mather 1985; Lee
1995; Tjandraningsih 2000; Greenhalgh 1991; Kabeer and Van Anh 2006; Hossain et
al. 1990; Kabeer and Mahmud 2004). Migrant women, as we noted earlier, face
additional problems related to the ambiguity of their legal entitlements, the 
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3 They suggested that women’s entry into the labour market could lead to decomposition of
patriarchal constraints, to their recomposition in new forms as well as their further
intensification.
cultural barriers that they face, the isolated nature of the work they do and the 
status of ‘the other’ that they occupy in the countries in which they work (Yeoh et
al. 1999; Yeoh and Huang 1999; Chin 1997; Essim and Smith 2004). 
Yet this is only one part of the story that emerges from the literature. The other
part testifies to the many positive changes that women have experienced in their
personal lives as a result of these opportunities. It points to the paradox of
subjectively favourable evaluations of work carried out in objectively unfavourable
conditions (Wolf 1992). These positive evaluations are not necessarily confined to
jobs generated by the global economy. Many of the activities that were taken up by
women in response to the economic recession and to the austerity measures 
associated with structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America were
geared to the local economy while in south Asia, the spread of microfinance 
services have contributed to women’s involvement in home-based piece work or
own account enterprise for a largely domestic market. In such cases, it is paid work
per se rather than work generated by the global economy that accounts for the
impacts in question. In other cases, it has been the expansion of economic
opportunities associated with the opening up to the global economy that has been
the main source of change. 
Clearly, women have not experienced these changes in uniform ways. There is, as
various studies have pointed out, a ‘geography of gender’ which differentiates the
structure of family and kinship, principles of inheritance and descent, marital 
practices and organisation of work in ways that spell very different parameters
within which women are able to exercise agency (Townsend and Momsen 1987;
Kandiyoti 1989; Kabeer 2003). The cultural acceptability of paid work, particularly
when it is outside the home, the varying effects of life course, the situation of
their households, the motivations which led women to take up work, the kind of
work they do and their status as workers, whether they are self employed or
waged labour, migrant or national labour, will all differentiate the work experience
for women in different parts of the world. To control for some of these differ-
ences, the focus of the paper is largely on women workers from lower income
households in mainly developing and transitional country contexts, although some
reference is made to the OECD countries as well. We begin our discussion in this
section by examining the literature on working women within their own national
contexts, differentiating between unmarried and married women. In subsequent
sections, we turn our focus to migrant women workers. 
3.2 Young women and the expansion of life chances 
By and large, evaluations of the entry of young unmarried women into paid work
have tended to be positive. One common theme that runs through this literature is
the greater sense of control over their own lives that their entry into paid work has
brought these women. In many, but not all cases, they had migrated into urban
areas to take up this work, thus moving out of the watchful surveillance of family
and community into the relative anonymity of the urban locale and the possibility
of some autonomy. 
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However, a comparison by Wolf (1992) of ‘factory daughters’ in Java with those in
Taiwan reminds us of the extent to which cultural constructions of family life, 
gender roles and filial obligations vary, even within the Asian context, and mediate
the impact of paid work for women. There appears to be a much stronger
emphasis on filial obligation as the rationale for working daughters in Taiwan than
among Javanese families in Indonesia. Taiwan is part of the East Asian regional belt
which is characterised by strong son preference and it is the interest of sons that
appears to have been paramount in parental strategies. Factory daughters in Taiwan
are described as more subject to parental control and to manipulation in the inter-
ests of the larger family (see also Greenhalgh 1985). 
Indonesia, along with other South East Asian countries, is not characterised by a
culture of marked son preference. There are also differences in controls exercised
over young women in West Java where local Islamic leaders colluded with employ-
ers to discipline young women inside and outside the factories (Mather 1985) and
Central Java, the location of Wolf’s study, where their lives were less circumscribed.
The young Javanese women she interviewed were well aware of the exploitative
conditions under which they work, but reported that their work gave them greater
room for manoeuvre, both geographically and personally, in a situation where their
life chances were severely limited (p.256). These changes were not apparent among
village daughters who had remained in agricultural and domestic work. Wolf
concluded, ‘Clearly, a greater ability to choose one’s own spouse or buy clothing
does not greatly alter structural relations of oppression and exploitation.
Nevertheless, these changes in movement, friendships, consumption, family 
decision-making, and marital choice are important to them’ (p.256). 
Davin (2004) writes about the thousands of young, single women who migrated
from the Chinese countryside to live and work in the export-processing zones of
southern China. While the assembly line jobs on offer ranked low in the 
occupational hierarchy by urban residents, they were fiercely competed for by rural
female migrants, many of whom had previously worked as unpaid labourers on
family farms. As Davin points out, ‘we cannot dismiss as meaningless the voices of
the many young women who affirm a sense of achievement and pride in the lives
they make for themselves as factory workers … And hardship may be a price worth
paying if the cash they earn allows them to change something they disliked in their
past or that they wish to avoid in their future (p.82).’  
Lee (1998) found that the most common explanation for their migration given by
young SEZ workers in China was poverty, but that this constituted the ‘respectable’
explanation. They later admitted their desire to escape from family restrictions and
to experience a new life. They retained links with their families, sending remittances
home and helping others to migrate, but they also enjoyed some purchasing power
of their own and a greater degree of personal freedom. A few sought more funda-
mental freedoms, avoiding unwelcome betrothals by distancing themselves from
home while others were paying off bride price in order to obtain divorce from
their husbands. 
In Malaysia, Ong (1987) documents the new subjectivities emerging among young
factory women, a self-determination and ability to resist parental authority in areas
such as choice of husband and timing of marriage, a personal life separate from
that of the family, the ability to leave home to escape intolerable domestic
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situations, a greater sense of responsibility in dealing with the consequences of
their own action and a widening of social horizons through their daily association
with workers of different ethnic identities. 
In Turkey, Eraydin and Erendil (1999) found that many of the young women working
in clothing factories no longer defined their work purely in terms of their familial
roles, to be abandoned when they got married or had children, but as a more 
permanent way of life. The overwhelming majority had made their own decision to
enter factory work for reasons that varied from wanting to make use of their skills
to seeking to escape the control exercised by family and neighbours. 
In Bangladesh, studies suggest that access to relatively well-paid work opportunities
in export garment factories had lessened the pressure on young women to get
married as soon as possible. Some used these opportunities to save for their own
dowries, thereby lessening their burden on parents, others to exercise some 
independent purchasing power and greater consumer choice. Their entry into 
factory work brought new friendships and a greater possibility of choosing who
they would marry as well as giving them a longer period of freedom from the
responsibilities that came with marriage and children (Kabeer 2000; Newby 1998;
Kibria 1995; Amin et al. 1998). 
In her study of small knitwear workshops in Santiago, Mexico, Wilson (1993) found
that these presented young women with work opportunities as well as the 
opportunity ‘to see themselves in a different light from the contradictory images
given by their mother’s generation, first as ‘child brides’ and later as ‘suffering
mothers’ (p.78). Women fought for better conditions and greater respect in the
workshops. At the same time, they tried to negotiate with parents and brothers
for a little more freedom and autonomy, at least for the right to spend part of
their wages on themselves: ‘They demanded a “youth” between childhood and
marriage and they actively engaged in discussions with prospective husbands as to a
just financial settlement after marriage …’ (p.79). And Guzman and Todaro (2001)
concluded on the basis of their analysis of studies of working women in Latin
America that while labour-market deregulation had brought women into the paid
work force in increasing numbers, and while the jobs they entered were largely
casual and insecure, they had nevertheless brought about important changes in
women’s lives: ‘Women now have the right to choose their destiny as individuals
not only as family members’ (p.19).4
3.3 Negotiations over married women’s entry into work
However, the picture that emerges from the literature is much more ambiguous
and contradictory when we shift out attention to married women who are report-
ed to encounter much greater resistance to their attempts to enter paid work from
their husbands than do unmarried women from the main authority figures within
their families. It seems clear that the balance of power within marital relations
relies to a far greater extent on female dependence than in other forms of gender
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4 Translated from Spanish by Dr Cecilia Ugaz.
relationships within the family. Studies from the widely differing contexts of Latin
America, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia all provide examples of husbands refusing to
give their wives permission to go out to work, despite household poverty or their
own unemployment. 
In Bangladesh, resistance by husbands was found to reflect fears about public
opinion, anxieties about wives’ sexual fidelity, concerns about possible neglect of
their own and their children’s wellbeing and the conviction that access to an 
independent income would threaten to destabilise their authority (Kabeer 2000). In
India, income earning on the part of both unmarried and married women present-
ed a threat to a man’s masculinity and to family’s social prestige if it belongs to
middle income groups (Vera-Sanso 2000; Blomqvist 2004). 
In Chile, Bee and Vogel (1997) reported that men’s fears rose of a pervasive
‘machista’ ideology that their partners might earn more than them and undermine
their position within the household, while others in the community might think
that a man who allowed his wife to work was incapable of providing for the family
on his own income. Certain kinds of work were also viewed as promoting wives’
infidelity to their husbands. In Kenya, Francis (2002) noted the reluctance on the
part of many men towards wives taking up trading activities reflected the fear that
greater financial independence on the part of women was a threat to their author-
ity and to the unity of the household. In Tanzania, Sender and Smith (1990) pointed
out that husbands strongly resisted their wives entry into wage labour in order to
maintain their own control over the household economy. It was largely female
household heads who were reliant on their own labour efforts for survival who
joined the waged labour force. 
In some contexts, wives had been able to overcome their husbands’ resistance,
making strategic use of local discourses of domesticity as well as their own intimate
knowledge of their husbands to reassure their anxieties. Widely observed was what
Villareal (1990) described as the strategy of ‘wielding and yielding’ where women
gained their husbands’ permission to take up paid work in return for some conces-
sion on their part. In Mexico, Gates (2002) found that women sought to offset the
threat to male authority represented by their desire to work with various kinds of
‘offers’ which reaffirmed this authority, including the ‘offer’ of their waged 
contributions to the household economy. In Bangladesh, married women often
handed over their wages to their husbands so that his role as breadwinner
remained symbolically intact (Kabeer 2000). Others presented the desire to take up
paid work in terms of children’s welfare, redefining motherhood to include the
purchase of basic essentials, treats or education for their children as well as the
more conventional provision of care. 
However, the most commonly observed form of ‘yielding’ was in the area of
housework with women assuring their husbands that they would not neglect their
domestic chores – and their husbands’ comforts. Married women working in 
garment factories in Bangladesh reported that they woke before dawn to make a
start on their household chores and went to bed after other family members in
order to complete them. Similar findings are reported in Chile’s agro-export sector,
where wives and mothers had to convince husbands that their paid employment
would not disrupt the fulfilment of the household responsibilities (Bee and Vogel,
op cit.). In Mexico, Gates found that the ‘offer’ to ensure the housework got done
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was one of the ways in which wives and daughters obtained permission to work.
As one woman explained, her job made little difference to her husband as long as
the house was clean and his meal ready when he came home. 
Despite the compromises that married women were observed to make in order to
take up paid work, there is evidence that their access to earning opportunities and
the opening up of horizons through work outside the home have led to important
shifts in the domestic balance of power. Quantitative studies from contexts as
widely divergent as Bangladesh (Newby 1998; Salway et al. 2005; Hashemi et al.
1996) India (Jejheeboy 2000; Holvoet 2005) Mexico (Adato et al. 2000), Zimbabwe
(Becker 1997) and Egypt (Kishor 2000) all testify to increase in women’s influence in
strategic areas of household decision-making as a result of their access to paid
work in the labour market or through access to microfinance. In some cases, the
shift in decision-making was from ‘norm-governed’ to ‘negotiated’ decision-making,
in others from male-dominated to joint or female dominated decision-making
(Kabeer 2001; Holvoet 2005; Adato et al. 2000). Quantitative studies also show
other evidence of change. Working women were more likely to report their own
savings in Bangladesh, higher levels of public mobility and lower levels of physical
violence from husbands (Salway et al. 2005); to seek out ante-natal care for them-
selves in Zimbabwe (Becker 1997) and to both vote and to consider that they have
considerable influence with their government in Honduras (Ver Beek 2001). 
Qualitative studies support these findings. In Bangladesh, for instance, the fact of
women’s paid work meant that their views and preferences were more likely to be
taken into account by husbands, regardless of who ‘controlled’ the wages (Kabeer
2000). Husbands were now more aware that not only were their wives earning
enough to support themselves but it was becoming socially more acceptable for
women to set up independent households, at least in urban areas. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, Bryceson (2000) reports that ‘increasingly peasant women
no longer see themselves as economic dependents, but as economic supporters
with dependents’ (p.57). In Kenya, Francis (2002) noted that the initial reluctance of
men to their wives’ independent trading activities often diminished in the face of
the incomes women were able to bring home: ‘Women who traded regularly often
had much more authority. Their command of a cash income gave them a greater
voice’ (p.180). Sender and Smith (1990) note in their study in rural Tanzania that it
was the availability of waged employment as an alternative means of survival,
whether on small holder farms or large tea estates, that allowed women an escape
route from oppressive, and often physically violent relationships with men (p.66).
Cornwall’s (2002) ethnographic study from urban West Africa dealt with a context
where married women have long been expected to contribute to household 
provisioning and work as traders and in food processing, but where men were 
finding it increasingly difficult to discharge their financial obligations to provide
‘feeding money’ to their wives and children. Unable to enforce ‘obedient servility’
through the sanction of withdrawing their contributions to wives who might be
earning more than them, men complained at the ‘waywardness’ of women and the
ease with which women ‘packed out’ when the going got rough. However, given
polygamous marital practices which allowed men to take another wife at any time,
thereby increasing the competition for his limited resources, but given also the
costs of going it alone, women were not using their incomes to leave their
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husbands but to build positions of ‘virtual autonomy’ from them. They built their
own houses and invested in their own social networks as a safety net against this
eventuality. 
In Colombia, women working in the cut flower industry used the resources at their
disposal to negotiate their freedom of movement with their husbands, their right
to work for pay and freedom from domestic violence (Friedemann-Sánchez 2006).
One woman walked out on her husband, leaving him with their children, in the
hope that withdrawal of her domestic labour would force a change in his abusive
behaviour. She returned when he had accepted her conditions and seven years later,
the conditions still held. Another gave up on her husband and was living with her
mother till she could afford to buy a house for herself and her children: ‘Here,
there is no one humiliating me and saying, ‘Be thankful that I feed you, be thankful
for this, be thankful for that’. Don’t you think it is better to drink agua de panela
(sugar water) with tranquillity that to eat a chicken with bitterness?’ (p.261). As
Sánchez-Friedemann pointed out, ‘Wage income was the indispensable factor
providing women with the means to support themselves and their children’. 
Married women workers in Chile valued work for the added financial security it
gave them as well as the break it offered from domestic routine (Bee and Vogel
1997). In the Dominican Republic, women who worked as unpaid family labour on
their own farms as well as waged labour on other farms began to claim part of the
proceeds on the family farm as a form of ‘wage’ (Raynolds 2002). It is noteworthy
that similar claims were not made by women whose only experience was as unpaid
family labour on the farm. 
However, not all negotiations resulted in outcomes that could be regarded as 
positive. Moore’s comment on the African context appears to have a wider
relevance: ‘conjugal conflicts over income and household decision-making has been
greatly exacerbated as men transfer their anxieties about loss of their jobs and their
declining contributions to household resources into the domestic domain’ (p.20).
Diminished self-esteem, frustrations at their declining position and the threat 
represented by their wives’ paid work have given rise to a range of hostile 
behaviours on the part of husbands (Chant 2002a and b; Johnson 2005; Mayoux
2001; Francis 2002; Kapadia 1996; Kabeer 2000; Beneria and Roldan 1987; Chant
and McIlwaine 1995; Bryceson 2000; Vera-Sanso 2000; Silberschmidt 1992 and
2001). In some cases, husbands simply left, often to set up new households with
other women or to return to the natal home where they could be looked after by
their mothers, sisters and other female kin. Others used their wives’ entry into paid
work as a pretext to withdraw their contributions to the collective welfare of the
household. Still others opted for unemployment rather than low status work, 
leaving their wives to shoulder the full responsibility of breadwinning (Bryceson
2000). However, as Francis (2002) points out from her Kenya fieldwork and
Mayoux from the Cameroon (2001), women who took on breadwinning 
responsibility did not necessary escape the male authority of husband or other kin. 
Elsewhere, studies show that men’s resistance to their wives’ paid work have taken
the form of appropriation of their wives’ earnings, drinking away their income,
extra marital affairs and resort to violence in their attempts to enforce their
authority within the household. Sometimes, male resistance has taken a collective
form. In Qua Qua, South Africa, where newly set up factories recruited a largely
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female labour force, there were riots among unemployed men who attacked
women factory workers and demanded that jobs should be given to men (Niehaus
1994). 
It is in the former Soviet bloc that the loss of the traditional male breadwinner role
appears to have had the most dramatic impacts. Despite high rates of female labour
force participation during the socialist era, gender difference and women’s 
association with domesticity was ‘relentlessly naturalised’. Men’s ability to cope with
economic reform and the erosion of their breadwinner status has been particularly
bleak in the light of its contrast with the security of employment they had enjoyed
in the socialist era: ‘when we were kings’. Their difficulties have been exacerbated
by the uncompromising calls in the media and public debate since the onset of
economic reform for a return to traditional model of the family, with women 
taking on primarily domestic and family oriented roles and men to take on the role
of the primary provider (Kay 2005). 
The rapid transition to the market economy and the stresses associated with the
loss of their breadwinning roles is thought to underlie the far more drastic rise in
male mortality rates in the immediate aftermath of reform in this region. For
instance, women’s life expectancy in Russia fell from 74.3 in 1991 to 71.2 in 1994,
men’s already lower life expectancy fell from 63.5 to 57.6 (Gavrilova et al. 2000).
Increased levels of alcohol consumption and alcohol-related diseases were found to
be among the contributory factors in rising mortality rates for both women and
men, but while men were more likely to respond to the growing economic and
social instability with suicide, women were more likely to be victims of homicide.
30–40 per cent of serious violent crime takes place within the family in Russia:
‘each year approximately 14,000 Russian women die at the hands of their partners,
a figure which those working in the field of domestic violence have compared with
the 17,000 fatalities which occurred during the ten years of the war in Afghanistan’
(Kay 2005: 1). 
Ashwin and Lytkina (2004) report on a qualitative study of 17 men who had lost
their primary breadwinning status during a two year study they carried out. Only
four were found to be coping well with their situation, of which three had found
alternatives to ‘work-centric’ self-definitions of masculinity: one had made repair
and improvements on the family home his main occupation; one was a pensioner
who found reward in his new role as grandfather and a third had opted for full
time responsibility for housework and care of their two adolescent sons while his
wife worked. The remaining 13 were suffering from intense demoralisation
expressed as depression and drunkenness.
3.4 Negotiations over the domestic division of labour: evidence of
change
One theme that cuts across most studies of negotiations over married women’s
entry into paid work, regardless of whether the final outcomes were judged to be
positive or negative, is the significance of the gender division of unpaid domestic
labour as a flashpoint in the negotiation process. As Chant (2000) observes, based
on her work in Costa Rica, men were often reluctant to give up their masculine
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privileges despite having lost, or abdicated, their responsibilities as primary bread-
winners has wider relevance – and exemption from unpaid domestic chores appears
to be one of the privileges most strongly defended. 
There is clearly some sense in which gender identities are understood, internalised
and negotiated that makes men unwilling to take up a larger share of unpaid
domestic work even in the face of women’s willingness to share their breadwinning
responsibilities. Yet there is nothing biologically preordained about male resistance,
and powerful as cultural norms may be, they are not immutable. It is therefore
worth looking for evidence of exceptions to the rule as possible pointers to the
possibility of change – before going on to consider what evidence for the absence
of change might signify. The literature search carried out for this paper offers some
interesting, though tentative, insights into the circumstances under which such
exceptions might occur and what this tells us about the possibility of more wide-
spread change in the future. 
A first set of exceptions appear to resonate with neo-classical accounts of rational
behaviour. In her comparison of a flower growing region of Ecuador from one with
traditional agriculture, Newman (2001) found that married women worked longer
hours in household tasks in all the households she surveyed but that there were
differentials between households where women worked and those where they did
not. In general, women put in longer hours in domestic work if their husbands did
not work than if they did but they worked fewer hours if they themselves were
employed than if they were not. The difference was particularly striking for the
flower growing areas where men and women earned similar wages. She found
that married men in these areas spent twice as much time in housework than did
married men elsewhere. Women in these jobs also spent less time in housework
than women elsewhere.5 Nevertheless, even the most egalitarian division of
domestic labour – those households where both women and men worked in the
flower industry – the imbalance was striking: men worked 76 minutes a day while
women worked 221 minutes. While men put in more time in paid work than
women, women had longer working days, regardless of whether or not they
worked. 
Cravey’s (1997) comparison of two industrial sites in Mexico offers insights into how
the changing organisation of production may also help to initiate changes in how
housework is shared within the home. One site was characterised by factory
regimes that had emerged in association with the earlier import-substituting period
of industrialisation and had an older, better paid, educated and largely male labour
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5 In the flower growing areas, employed married men worked an average of 60 minutes a 
day when their wives also worked and 40 minutes when their wives did not work. When 
married men worked in the flower industry, they worked 76 minutes if their wives worked 
and 36 minutes if they did not. With employed married women, they worked 288 minutes 
a day when their husbands worked and 444 minutes if they did not. Married women who 
were not working, worked 539 minutes a day if their husbands worked and 559 if they did 
not. However, when married women worked in the flower industry, they worked 221 
minutes if their husbands also worked and 253 if they did not. When married men and 
women worked in the flower industry, men 76 worked minutes a day and women worked 
221 minutes a day.
force. The other was characterised by the new maquiladora (assembly line) system of
production and a younger and more mixed labour force. She found that the older
industrial regime had helped to structure largely nuclear households which survived
on the wages and benefits of a single male household head. In the new industrial
zones, however, lower wages and less security of employment had led to a greater
diversity of family forms, including many more extended families made up of
siblings, cousins and friends, as well as sub-nuclear families. Most households had
more than one earner. 
The two sites were associated with differing divisions of domestic labour with
much greater fluidity in the new zones: over two-thirds of the households reported
some male contribution although one or more female members continued to take
primary responsibility. There were reports of men who regularly assumed 
responsibility for some domestic tasks. Husbands and wives often alternated their
work schedules, one working the day shift and the other the night shift so that
some one was at home to look after the children. Cravey suggests that these 
findings indicate challenges to long-standing gender norms, ‘amounting even to a
renegotiation of gender itself’ (p.176). 
A study of 20 households in Santiago, Chile by Alméras (2000) found a weak 
relationship between women’s contribution to household income and the gender
division of unpaid work. While working women bore a greater proportion of the
domestic responsibility among couples when they earned less than 45 per cent of
the income earned by their spouse, an increase in their contributions did not result
in greater equality in domestic responsibilities. Only in two households in which
women earned considerably more than their husbands (121 per cent and 336 per
cent more) did men assume a greater share of unpaid domestic work than women.
In the rest of the households, factors other than the relative contribution to house-
hold income explained variations in men’s share of domestic work. One factor was
the youth of the couple, suggesting change may be underway among the younger
generation. The other was family history: men who had received early socialisation
in household chores from their mothers entered marriage with the expert knowl-
edge of domestic tasks and took pride in it. As Alméras points out, family socialisa-
tion was proving more effective than the existing system of formal education in
constructing new models of masculinity. 
Gutmann’s ethnographic study of a low income neighbourhood in Mexico City
(1996) also pointed to some of the ways in which notions of masculinity have been
changing among working class men, including taking a larger share of housework in
many cases. He too identified men’s own experiences as children along with the
growing importance of women’s paid work as factors bringing about change. In
addition, Gutmann suggests that it is growing feminist consciousness among work-
ing women themselves and their willingness to bring pressures to bear on their
husbands and brothers that has brought about some of these changes. 
Finally, a number of studies suggest that another, less immediately obvious, explana-
tion for the apparent resilience in the gender division of domestic labour might be
that it conceals changes than we are not aware of because of a tendency to under-
report. The fault may lie with the researchers who expect to find the absence of
men from housework. Thus Gutmann notes that the elite model of female domes-
ticity in Mexico has tended to colour how researchers view the domestic division of
labour in working class households as well. 
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Alternatively, it may reflect concealment or under-valuation by men themselves.
Men often gloss over their contributions to housework in order to preserve their
masculine image. For instance, Searle-Chatterjee reports how men of the Sweeper
caste in Benares hide themselves from public view when they cook or clean pots
(cited by Jackson 1999). Alméras points out how one of her male informants who
cared for his children on a regular basis, while his wife worked in the factory sought
to downplay his sustained domestic labour ‘as if it contradicted his ideal self-image’.
Alternatively, they may, as in the case of the male retrenched workers in urban
China interviewed by Cook and Jolly (2001) fail to notice or simply discount – any
housework they may have done. One male interviewee told them: ‘Before I didn’t
even know how to cook soup. Now I can cook everything … tidy up, wash clothes.
I don’t even need to use a washing machine, just a washing board. I can wash
clothes, no problem. I just stay at home every day, don’t work anything out. It feels
awful just to stay there’.
3.5 Negotiations over the domestic division of labour: men’s 
resistance and women’s responses 
However, these reports of fluidity in domestic gender roles appear to be the
exceptions that prove the rule. Many more studies testify to what Pearson describes
as ‘the impressive resistance of men to an equal involvement in domestic work’
(2000: 225), making evidence that women are working a ‘double day’ or a ‘second
shift’ among the least controversial findings in studies on women’s work in different
parts of the world (Koch Laier 1997). Male unemployment does not necessarily shift
this pattern: Safa (1999) noted that almost none of the retired or unemployed men
in a study set in the Dominican Republic provided regular help with childcare or
housework to their working wives. Newman’s study (cited earlier) found that
women’s hours of domestic work increase when men are unemployed, regardless
whether they themselves are employed or not. Nor is male resistance to domestic
work confined to less industrialised countries. Data from an OECD study (2001
cited in Hassim and Razavi 2006) suggests that women employed in full time paid
work nevertheless put in more hours of unpaid work than men: the ratio of
women’s time in unpaid work to men’s varied from a low of 1.3 in Canada (1998
figures) to a high of 3.6 in Italy (1989 figures). A study of 50 couples in the United
States reported that unemployed husbands of employed wives tended to do less
housework than the employed husbands of employed wives (Hochschild and
Mauchang 1990).
Women have often colluded with men’s reluctance to participate in housework. In
some cases, this can be an active choice on their part. Gender identities are 
relationally constructed and women may have their reasons for not wanting some
dimensions to change. As Chant (2002a) points out, they may resist male help
because it suggests that they do not have a ‘real’ man for a partner or because they
have traditionally derived social legitimacy through taking charge of unpaid domes-
tic tasks. The paramount role that mothering occupies in their lives may meant that
‘employment … has not replaced the centrality of domesticity for women but 
simply been incorporated into an ever-expanding portfolio of maternal obligations’
(p.467). 
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However, as our earlier examples show, more often than not, the unfair distribution
of domestic work appears to be the price that many women have to pay if they
want to take up paid work and stay married. Their options are curtailed by the risks
associated with the kinds of work available to them, risks generated by the volatile
nature of market forces in the global economy and the absence of any form of
social protection for the kinds of informal activities in which most of them earn
their living. In the absence of public safety net measures to offset the risks of
commodification, it is understandable that women, particularly those with young
children, will endeavour not to disrupt the primary protection they have against full
commodification: their families and the wider social networks within which they
are located. This means that they will seek, as far as possible, to defuse the threat
that their paid work might represent to male breadwinner identity. 
On the other hand, we would not expect all women to acquiesce without protest
to the compromises required of them. Many of the women working in the flower
industry in Colombia expressed their dissatisfaction with the unfair distribution of
labour, pointing out that the unreciprocated additional physical labour and 
emotional work entailed made living with men a burden. One woman had chosen
to live apart from the father of her child so that she would not have to cook, iron
and clean for him: ‘Just like this we have a life of husband and wife … except he
does not control me or order me around’ (Friedemann-Sánchez 2006: 260).
Working women in the Dominican Republic often preferred to live with their
parental family than with partners because they could expect more help with their
childcare and domestic responsibilities. 
In Eastern and Southern Africa, Bryceson (2000) notes the tensions set up by the
shifting balance of power as women’s increased access to cash earnings put them
in a position to decide on its disposal, particular when men failed to live up to their
traditional duties of meeting the bulk of household monetary expenses. While
many men admitted the necessity of their wives’ earnings, they remained resentful,
sometimes turning to alcohol, wife beating or marrying another wife. However,
female resentment surfaced as well. Despite their enhanced cash earning roles,
women were still expected to perform all the household work, with little help
from husbands with childcare or the arduous tasks of African domestic life: water
and firewood collection, cooking and cleaning. Wright’s research in Lesotho shows
strains set up by divergence between material contributions and domestic power
relations. Men’s resistance to sharing authority despite women’s primary bread-win-
ning roles in over a third of her sample probably contributed to the growing 
numbers of women not marrying at all. 
In her study of the Kisii in Kenya, Silberschmidt (1992) traces the growing 
disjuncture between the model of the ‘ideal family’ regularly promoted by radio
broadcasts, newspapers and church organisations and the ability of all but a handful
of men to live up to the its image of the household head: ‘(he) has several wives,
many children, a great deal of land and a lot of cattle and that he is the decision-
maker who commands economic resources and power’. Men in the poorest 
economic strata were least able to conform to this image, but often turned to
alcohol to deal with their frustration. Women complained that they could not rely
on either financial support or the labour of their men folk and that having a man in
the home was like having an ‘extra baby’ (p.240).
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The increasing importance of women’s groups set up by development organisations
represented a further source of resentment for many men. Though intended to
generate income, these groups also provided a forum for women to come together
as a force within the village community. ‘Men’ according to one Kenyan commen-
tator cited in Silberschmidt (1992) ‘had been lions in the past but their teeth had
been pulled by women’s liberation’.
As a result of conflicting expectations and realities in conditions of economic stress,
marriage appears to have become increasingly unattractive to both women and
men in many parts of the world (Chant 2002b; Francis 1998 and 2002,
Silberschmidt 1992 and 2001). In Latin America, where a great deal of marital life
among the popular classes has historically consisted of a succession of consensual
unions, the initiative for break up of a relationship now appears to rest as much
with women as with men (Safa 1999). Poorer women may still be more likely to be
abandoned than wealthier ones, but many more are now taking the step to leave
their husbands on their own or their children’s account. This may be a factor in
explaining the strong association between the ‘feminisation’ of household headship
in Latin America and the rise in women’s labour force participation (Chant 2002a;
Jelin and Díaz-Moñoz 2003). 
Commenting on evidence from the African context, Moore points out: ‘Increasing
numbers of women are refusing to marry because marriage provides little security
for them and their children while adding to their vulnerability through the demands
husbands can make on their wives’ labour, time and income’. On the other hand,
more and men are refusing to marry and/or acknowledge paternity because they
do not have the resources … to enter into family commitments’ (Moore 1994: 20).
In East and South East Asia, as well, there is evidence of rising rates of divorce but
also increasing numbers of women and men delaying marriage or not marrying at
all. We will return to this trend in a later section of the paper but note here that it
is part of a growing diversity of family forms evident in many different parts of the
world. (Moore 1994; Francis 2002; Niehaus 1994; Chant 2002a; Jelin and Díaz-
Moñoz, 2003): children remaining with parents into late adulthood; co-residence of
adult, unmarried siblings; residential arrangements involving grandparents and
grandchildren and extended three generation families are all noted alongside rising
female headship.
In those parts of the world, such as the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia,
family structures continue to be organised along tighter-knit corporate lines and the
incidence of both divorce and female headship appears to be generally lower. In
South Asia, where marriage remains the universally prescribed destiny for women
and men, and women on their own are socially vulnerable, women do not 
generally have the option of setting up independent households. In Madras, for
instance, Blomqvist (2004) found that suicide was commonly talked about by
women workers as the only way a woman could leave her husband, even if she was
economically self-sufficient. Where separation did occur, it generally reflected
extreme circumstances of alcoholism or abuse rather than quarrels over the 
domestic division of labour.
However it is  possible that national data may not be capturing the strains of
marital relationships among the poor. National data from Bangladesh presents a
remarkably constant picture of marital stability but micro-level studies offer a very
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different picture, documenting much higher levels of male desertion and divorce,
particularly among the poor (Kabeer 1988; Alam 1985). Some evidence of this 
discrepancy is evident in a recent panel survey from Bangladesh (Kabeer 2004).
Only 1.5 per cent of women aged 15+ described themselves as divorced or separat-
ed compared to 0.3 per cent of men. However the study noted a dramatic rise in
female-headship between 1994 and 2001 among households who had either
remained poor during this period or declined into poverty. While the overwhelming
majority of these female heads described themselves as widowed, it is unlikely that
adult male mortality rates had risen sufficiently rapidly during this period as to
account for this effect. It is likely that many of the female heads were in fact
divorced. 
Agarwal (2003) posits a similar possibility for India. Noting low, but rising rates of
formal divorce, she notes also that estimates of formal divorce do not capture the
vast numbers of desertions and men remarrying without divorce. Given the high
levels of vulnerability faced by women on their own in much of South Asia, marital
breakdowns continue to be initiated largely by men. This may be changing in some
contexts. Many of the women who migrate to urban areas in Bangladesh are 
leaving behind abusive husbands to set up a household on their own or with other
extended kin (Kabeer 2000). As Islam and Zeitlyn (1989) note, this has given rise to
a strong matrifocal pattern to households in Dhaka’s urban slums. 
4 The commodification of care and 
cleaning the global economy
It will be seen from the preceding discussion that rise in the labour force participa-
tion of women has not done a great deal to challenge inequalities in the gender
division of unpaid domestic work, particularly among married women. Whether
women remain with their husbands, are left by them or choose to leave them to
head their own households, an invisible ‘feminisation of responsibility’,6 as Sylvia
Chant puts it, appears to be accompanying the more visible ‘feminisation of paid
work’ documented in the literature (2007). This has clearly offset some of the 
positive effects of such work for their status and wellbeing and helps to explain
some of the more pessimistic conclusions about the impacts of women’s access to
paid work within the literature. 
Working women have sought to cope with these dual responsibilities in various
ways, often entailing adverse consequences for themselves or for their children.
Some have left their husbands as a way of cutting back some of their workloads
but they must still cope with dual responsibilities of caring for their children and
earning a living. Some put in longer hours of work to cope with the ‘double shift’,
leading to exhaustion or ‘burn out’ (Moser 1989). Some take their children to work
with them: studies report children accompanying their mothers to factories, 
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6 Chant’s actual phrase is ‘the feminisation of responsibility and obligation’. I have opted for a 
shorter version of her phrase as it adequately captures what I would like to convey. 
building sites, roadsides and fields. Sometimes the children work alongside them.
Some leave their children locked at home because they have no one to care for
them. Some rely on older children, most often daughters, but also other, usually
female, relatives to share the burden: siblings, their own mothers and so on. Still
others hire in domestic help.
There is, of course, a class dimension to these responses. While working women at
the lower end of the economic spectrum across the world generally turn to family,
kin and neighbours for assistance in their domestic responsibilities, working women
at the higher end turn to the market for paid help. This latter response has a long-
standing history in many countries, with women migrating from the countryside to
take up domestic service in middle class homes. However, today the market in
domestic work and childcare is a global one and the women who migrate are
crossing national borders in their search for work. It is this strand of the global
feminisation of paid work that will be discussed next. 
4.1 The politics of housework and the trade in ‘maids and nannies’
The growth in the global demand for ‘nannies and maids’ reflects both the 
economics and demographics of affluence (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003;
Caouette et al. 2006; UNFPA 2006). Wealthier countries have undergone an
extended period of fertility decline. The resulting ageing of their populations has
brought with it an increasing demand for elderly care which offsets the decline in
care responsibilities for children. In addition, these are generally countries where,
alongside declining fertility rates, there has been a rise in education levels and 
aspirations among the general population and a steady increase in labour force 
participation by women. As more and more educated women move into work, it is
not only the elite, but also middle class women, who come to rely on women from
poor and marginalised groups and ethnic minorities within their own countries and
now, increasingly from abroad, to take up their domestic responsibilities. As a
result, domestic service, which had nearly disappeared in the West, has returned in
a significant way.
We see similar processes at work within the rapidly growing regions of the south
as well. As the local populations of Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea
move out of less desirable forms of work on the construction sites, farms, planta-
tions and, of course, domestic service into jobs with better-pay and working 
conditions in the manufacturing and service economy, less educated migrants from
neighbouring countries fill the jobs they have vacated. In Latin America, women
from the poorer countries of Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay go to work for families in
the more affluent neighbouring countries of Argentina and Chile. Given the
absence of any social support for working women’s responsibilities in the care of
children and the elderly, and a largely intact gender division of roles and responsibil-
ities within the home, women in these countries have turned to the paid labour of
migrant women from other poorer countries in the region. Much of this labour is
on short-term contracts but engages in repeat migration so that periods of
absence from home can add up to several years. 
The growth in the flow of migrant domestic workers into Western Europe and
North America as well as Japan, Taiwan and other higher growth countries in Asia
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and Latin America has thus closely mirrored the rise in female labour force 
participation, particularly among educated married women, within these countries.
In the US, for instance, the proportion of mothers with children under 6 in paid
work rose from 15 per cent in 1950 to 65 per cent by the end of the century.
Three-quarters of mothers of children under 18, and two-thirds of those with 
children aged one or less, now works for pay. A 1999 survey reported that women
did an average of 30 hours of housework a week in 1965, declining to 17.5 hours in
1995 with rise in dual earner families (Ehrenreich 2003). While the early years of
this decline reflected some relaxation of standards and redistribution of chores,7 by
the 1990s, it reflected an increasing reliance on paid domestic labour. Between
1995 and 1999 alone, there was a 53 per cent increase in households using cleaning
services at least once a month. 
In Singapore the average participation of married women in the labour force
increased from 29 per cent in 1980 to around 45 per cent in 1994. It was accompa-
nied by a steady rise in the number of foreign maids as local women preferred to
work in factories. While it took around ten years for the number of maids to reach
20,000 from the limited numbers allowed in 1978, numbers doubled the following
year to 40,000 and rose steadily to current estimates of 150,000. This represents
one foreign maid in every eight households in Singapore (Yeoh et al. 1999). Similar
trends are to be found in Kuwait (Shah et al. 1991). The increase in the participation
of Kuwaiti women in professional and technical occupations from 22 per cent in
1965 to 51 per cent in 1985 was accompanied by a rise in the percentage of Kuwaiti
households with at least one maid from 13 per cent in 1977/79 to 62 per cent in
1986/87. Data from the 1985 census showed that 84 per cent of Asian women
migrants in the Kuwaiti labour force were in domestic service compared to less
than 1 per cent of Kuwaiti women. 
The supply of a migrant labour force willing to do the difficult, dirty and dangerous
work that citizens of wealthy countries shun reflects the existence of wide, and
widening, global disparities in wages and living standards. In the 1990s, Filipina
migrant women earned an average of $176 a month as teachers, nurses and clerical
workers in the Philippines but $200 a month in Singapore, $450 in Hong Kong,
$700 in Italy or $1,400 in LA in the less-skilled categories of nannies, maids and
care service workers. While the search for higher earnings provides the overarching
explanation for migration flows, microlevel analysis suggests a greater diversity of
motivations on the part of women. Educated women leave in search of markets
that do not discriminate against them as severely as the ones they leave behind, less
educated women in search of higher returns to unskilled labour than those prevail-
ing in local markets. Enterprising young women migrate in response to the rosy
picture of the life they could lead, a picture culled from TV images and recruitment
agencies, or in a spirit of adventure, to see the world and broaden their horizons.
For some women, migration represents a form of escape: from the prospect of
arranged marriages, abusive husbands or, more generally, from the patriarchal 
traditions of their communities (see, for instance, Ryang 2002; Blanchet 2005a;
Oishi 2005). 
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7 Men increased their time in scrubbing, vacuuming and sweeping by 240 per cent (bringing 
up to 1.7 hours a week) while women decreased their hours by 7 per cent to 6.7 hours a 
week. However, most of these changes took place between the 1970s and mid-eighties.
However, as Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2003) point out, the global trade in
women’s domestic services should not be seen in terms of a simple synergy
between the needs of affluent women for paid help at home and the needs of
poorer women for paid work. It is also a reflection of the politics of reproductive
labour within the home which we touched in the earlier section. Women’s
increased earning power may have failed to bring out a more egalitarian distribu-
tion of domestic workloads or greater public support for their care responsibilities
but it has given some families the option of hiring in the services of other women
to take up some of this workload. ‘So strictly speaking the presence of immigrant
nannies does not enable affluent women to enter the workforce; it enables 
affluent men to continue avoiding the second shift’ (p.9). Intra-household conflicts
over the distribution of domestic responsibilities are thus increasingly resolved
through resort to the market for domestic labour. One cleaning service in the US
reports that it closes 30–35 per cent of sales by making follow-up calls on Saturday
mornings, ‘the prime time for arguing over the fact that the house is a mess’
(Ehrenreich 2003: 90). 
Paid domestic service thus has the utilitarian function of relieving women of their
unpaid domestic responsibilities. It also has a symbolic role, contributing to particu-
lar constructions of women and family life in different contexts. In the US, it is
claimed that paid domestics are required to remain invisible in order to maintain
the fiction of the high-achieving professional woman who can do it all (Hochschild
2003). Elsewhere, however, they are valued for their visibility since they are also a
form of conspicuous consumption (Chin 1997). Shah et al. (1991) found that the 
presence of maids in Kuwaiti households was only weakly related to the work 
status of female members. There was an average of three maids to a household in
UAE while between 80–90 per cent of women interviewed in Kuwait and Oman
reported that they could not do without domestics: ‘Maids, it seems, have come to
be “consumed” for social status and other reasons in addition to carrying out
domestic and childcare duties for working women’ (p.471).  
4.2 Transnational families and marital relations 
The trade in paid domestic workers thus contributes to particular constructions of
marriage, motherhood and family life among those who purchase their services. It
also contributes to changing notions and practices of family life and motherhood
among those who supply these services. The separation of international migrants
from their families for frequently recurring or extended periods of time has given
rise to the phenomenon of transnational families whose members are separated by
national boundaries but united by contemporary forms of communication. Texting,
telephones and cheaper travel costs which allow frequent interactions and 
occasional return visits maintain the ties of transnational family life in the absence
of the possibility for family re-unification overseas ((Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila
1997; Jolly and Reeves 2005). 
Migration studies offer mixed findings about how families cope when it is female
members who migrate. The migration of daughters appears to cause the least 
disruption and is often undertaken as part of a joint family strategy in a number of
countries. Parents often encourage their daughters to migrate to take advantage of
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the prospect of wage employment in the city in the expectation that daughters will
be more likely than sons to remit money after migration. This is borne out by some
studies from both Thailand and the Philippines (National Statistical Office 1988 cited
in De Jong and Richter 1996; see also Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 2005). 
However, married women (with or without children) who migrate on their own,
experience the process of migration very differently from both single women and
from men as a category. While men’s ascribed breadwinner responsibilities makes
migration more socially acceptable, these women are more likely to be seen to
have transgressed socially ascribed roles of wives and mothers which require them
to stay with their families. Their experience is therefore coloured to a greater
extent than that of men by how their families and communities deal with their
sojourn abroad. There are reports in the literature of husbands who become more
respectful of their wives in the face of their capacity to earn abroad. There are also
cases where the remittances sent by women provided the basis of cooperative 
economic ventures between husband and wife (Sidiqqui 2001; Oishi 2005). In-depth
studies from the Philippines found that many of the men who juggled paid work
and domestic labour in their wives’ absence expressed greater appreciation for the
work customarily done by women. A few had opted for full time care-giving role
(Asis et al. 2004). 
The bulk of studies, however, paint a less harmonious picture. They suggest that
while migration by men seems to have little effect on their marriages, migration
and marital dissolution are closely linked in the case of women, although the 
direction of causality is not always clear (Zlotnik 1995: 265). In some cases, 
migration was a practical solution to coping with a failed marriage and the need to
provide for children without a male breadwinner. As a Latina migrant in Israel told
Raijman et al. (2003): ‘In Bolivia, I used to sell jewellery but I only made $60 a
month … When I decided to separate from my husband, I realised that migration
was the only available alternative for me in order to earning a living for me and my
children. Since my arrival I have been working in domestic service. It is hard for me
… It is even harder to be away from my children. But for me it is the only possible
way to economic independence’. Oishi (2005) reports how some of the Filipina
women in her study migrated in order to become financially independent enough
to leave oppressive relationships with their husbands or in-laws. One did not inform
her husband of her decision to migrate until after she had reached Dubai. 
In other cases, marriages break down as a result of the wives’ prolonged absence
or of the husbands’ responses to her absence. It appears that husbands often find it
difficult to cope with their wives’ migration. A study of Lao migrant workers found
that adaptation to altered roles implied by women’s absence put a considerable
strain on marital relations (Caouette et al. 2006). Husbands reported their feelings
of inadequacy at not having been able sustain their families without their wives
going abroad and their shame at having to do housework. Gamburd (2003)
observed that in Sri Lanka, a wife’s overseas employment appeared to pose a 
serious threat to the husband’s masculinity, leading to compensatory behaviour on
his part in the form of drinking, gambling and womanising: ‘Many men feel a loss of
self-respect and dignity when their wives become breadwinners. Such men only
reluctantly take over the “women’s work” of childcare and cooking; if possible, they
arrange to have female relatives assume these duties in accordance with strongly
felt local gender roles’ (p.190). 
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Similarly, Oishi (2005) reported that husbands of migrants from Bangladesh,
Philippines and Sri Lanka spent as much of remittances on gambling, drinking, 
monkey business (womanising) and general ‘merry-making’. She cites the case of a
Sri Lankan migrant who had sent monthly remittances back to her husband for the
four years she worked in Lebanon only to find, on her return, that her husband had
wasted it on alcohol. When she later emigrated to Saudi Arabia, she sent back only
50 per cent of her savings, putting the rest in a bank account in her name. 
Studies from Bangladesh confirm the association between female migration and
marital instability. Oishi found that Bangladeshi women who migrated had higher
rates of divorce and separation than the rest of the population at departure (8 per
cent compared to 1 per cent in general population) and even higher rates upon
their return (17 per cent) or among those who were still abroad (19 per cent). Of
222 female Bangladeshi migrants followed up after their return, Blanchet (2005a)
found that while 14 per cent had been already divorced or separated when they
first migrated, 24 per cent were divorced/separated after their return. Qualitative
research revealed some of the reasons for subsequent marital breakdown.
Interestingly (for the Bangladesh context) Blanchet (2005a) found that most
women had taken the initiative to leave the marriage, unhappy at the waste of
their savings by husbands or simply to end an oppressive relationship: ‘these women
claimed that the loss of fear, the ability to take decisions and the control of finan-
cial assets, all gains which were the result of their migration, permitted them to
take such a decision’ (p.14). 
4.3 Transnational families and motherhood 
While women may be able to come to terms with leaving their husbands behind,
and may even have sought to migrate in order to do so, it is a very different story
when it comes to leaving behind their children. Working mothers who migrate
have had to abandon the ideology of ‘family in one place’ based on the practice of
unpaid and privatised mothering in favour of new models of transnational mother-
ing which emphasise their breadwinning roles (which are, ironically, often geared to
caring for the children of others). Like other working mothers, they must find ways
to balance the demands of their paid work with their mothering responsibilities,
but their options are complicated by the physical distance between their work 
location and their home. While European and American women commute to work
in an average of 28 minutes a day, women from the Philippines and Sri Lanka must
cross the world in search of jobs (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003). 
The arrangements that women migrants make for the care of their children in
their absence echo those made by other working women, but their implications
are complicated by the distance between their work and home. Some female
migrants may earn enough to hire domestic labour in their home countries. This
was the case among migrant Filipinas working as domestics in Los Angeles and
Rome (Parrenas 2001). However this is an option open to very few migrant 
mothers8 and most turn to the family and extended kin networks. 
Husbands do not feature prominently in these arrangements. They may be unable
to provide primary care if they are themselves in full time employment or they may
reluctant to do so. In any case, given the deterioration in marital relations often
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associated with women’s migration, it is not surprising that migrant women from a
diversity of contexts try to leave their children with ‘other mothers’ within the
extended family, with their own mothers often their most preferred option
(Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Hochschild 2003). A study of Sri Lankan female
migrants found that grandmothers made up 50 per cent of primary carers (Save
the Children 2006). Fathers made up 26 per cent and the rest were made up of
other female kin.9 Other studies suggest that children are left with their grand-
mothers, aunts and fathers in that order with orphanages sometimes used as a last
resort. 
‘Mothering’ as Glenn points out, ‘more than any aspect of gender – has been 
subject to essentialist interpretation: seen as natural, universal and unchanging’
(1994: 3). Migrant mothers who leave their children behind present a challenge to
public perceptions of the ideal family and are singled out for unfavourable, often
morally loaded, comment. The media vilifies them as unnatural mothers or ‘promis-
cuous, selfish, pleasure-seeking women who neglect their husbands and children
(Gamburd 2003: 191). Staff from NGOs working with families of migrants report
cases of children becoming estranged from parents and seeing them only as sources
of gifts and money or blaming them for problems such as delinquency, drugs and
premarital sex (Bryant 2005). Researchers have suggested children of migrants are
spoilt and wasteful, in some cases, or lonely and resentful in others. However these
views do not always control for the fact that similar problems may occur among
children of non-migrant families. The few comparative studies have been carried
out report mixed evidence. 
In the Philippines, Battistella and Conaco (1996, 1998) found that children of
migrant parents lagged behind in school grades to children with both parents 
present and were less well adjusted socially. Children of migrant mothers reported
lower grades and poorer social adjustment to other children. However, they did not
find evidence of greater psychological problems among children of migrants 
compared to those of non-migrants: measures of anxiety found migrants’ children
performing better while they were identical on measures of loneliness.
A 2002 study by the University of the Philippines (cited in Bryant 2005) found that
children of migrants were healthier (as far as ability to do physical activities and
reports of illness were concerned) than children of non-migrants and displayed 
similar academic performance. It also found children of migrants have no more
problems with relationships or emotional states than those of non-migrants,
although they were more likely to mention marital problems among parents. 
A study by the Scalabrini Migration Centre (2003) reported that more than half the
children said they accepted their parents’ decision to migrate while 35–39 per cent
said they found it difficult but were coping. Around 3 per cent of children were
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8 Parrenas reports that this is more likely to happen among the more educated Filipina 
women who migrate to the US or Europe. However, even in the Philippines, only 2 per
cent of working women in the Philippines can afford to hire domestic help.
9 However, it also found that husbands of migrants reported much higher levels of
involvement in various caring activities than husbands of both non-migrant working as well 
as non-working women, and they reported higher levels comfort with these new roles.
against their parents’ migration, rising to 6.5 per cent when it came to mothers’
migration. The study did not find any systematic difference in terms of verbal, sexual
or physical abuse and found similar ratings of parents’ marriages – except for
children of migrant mothers. The study noted however that with divorce impossible
and legal separation difficult, migration may be the only way for women to escape
from a failed marriage. 
A study from Thailand (Jones and Kittisuksathit 2003) found little evidence that
migration created social problems among children. Meeting material needs was
widely viewed as the most important precondition for meeting other goals such as
family harmony and international migration was seen as an effective way for meet-
ing basic needs. However, a study by Save the Children (2006) in Sri Lanka did find
that the educational performance of children of migrant mothers was lower than
that of children in two control groups: children of working mothers (who were the
highest scorers) and children of non-working mothers. This was despite the fact
that migrant mothers had higher levels of education than non-migrant mothers.
School attendance was also higher among children of working mothers and lowest
among children of migrating mothers. Caregivers reported some emotional 
problems among children after the departure of mothers: 22 per cent of children
under five as far as loss of appetite, 20 per cent of children of all ages showed
increased temper tantrums and 10 per cent of older children (15–18) showed lower
levels of concentration. 
There are a number of reasons why children of migrants may not be any more at
risk from emotional and other problems than children of non-migrants (Bryant
2005). Poverty is often at the root of many family problems and migration is seen
as an effective way of addressing this problem. The support of the extended family
also makes a difference in ensuring that children and parents do not have to cope
with the effects of migration on their own and filling in some of the gap left by
absent parents (Parrenas 2003). Nevertheless, it remains the case that the mothers’
absence is often more keenly felt that fathers’ and that the extended family finds it
more difficult to fill in for absent mothers. Studies suggest that children view the
departure of fathers very differently from the departure of mothers. Fathers are
seen to migrate as an extension of their breadwinning roles, mothers out of need.
While many children express the preference that fathers migrate rather than 
mothers, they also are aware of their mothers’ efforts on their behalf. One study
reported greater sadness and worry on the part of children when mothers were
absent than fathers (University of Philippines 2002). 
From the mothers’ perspective, the decision to migrate is not an easy one. They are
caught between the need to secure their children’s future and the loss of the daily
intimacies of bringing up children. Some of the difficult trade-offs that they face
were spelt out by the Latin American migrants to Israel (Raijman et al. 2003): ‘You
have to decide either to go out, fight for life and making a living or stay at home
with the children but without the possibility of having a better future. It is especially
difficult if you are a single or divorced mother as in my case. If I had a husband to
share the burden with me, it would have been a completely different story. I would
never have left’ (p.742). Yet as the authors points out, despite the ‘self-redeeming
discourses’ that transnational mothers may adopt, their decision to migrate remains
a source of distress and ambivalence. As one of their respondents maintained, no
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mother can be at ease with having left her children behind: ‘the love of a mother
cannot be replaced and yet, I am afraid that she will forget me. There is always the
fear that time and distance will make her forget me’ (p.744). 
Nevertheless, despite the many risks and costs associated with the migration 
experience for women, and the particular nature of the costs experienced by
migrant mothers, migration has also had a positive aspect for many women. While
many female, and male, migrants report a decline in status in receiving countries,
taking on jobs far below their actual qualifications would merit, they also report an
increase in prosperity at home. It is this hope, one that appears to be more often
realised than not in the light of the scale of remittances to developing countries,
that sustains them through their period away from home. For marginalised groups,
migration provides the opportunity to free themselves from the constraining 
features of their societies at home.  A study of female migration in Nepal (Hausner
2005) pointed out that while Nepali migrants were looked down in India, they
were also able to free themselves of the rigid social hierarchies of the home 
society, to be simply regarded as ‘Nepali’: the national need to identify which caste
or ethnic group they belong to disappears in the wider context. 
As Zlotnik (1995) notes, the well documented association between female 
migration and marital breakdown embodies multiple and contradictory experiences:
‘Often the dissolution of marriage implies not only that women must support
themselves and their kin, but also that they gain freedom of action. Similarly, 
separation or divorce is more likely upon a woman’s return not only because of the
strains associated with migration but also because through migration, women gain
the self assurance needed to leave their husbands. Thus, Filipino women whose
marriages are failing tend to opt for migration to assert their independence and
minimise the stigma attached to separated women, especially since divorce is not
possible in the Philippines’ (p.265). Indeed, migration is often referred to as the
Filipino divorce (Parrenas 2003). 
Dannecker (2005a) found that while male Bangladeshi migrants reported problems
with different ethnic groups in Malaysia, Bangladeshi women provided positive
accounts of their factory work and social interactions outside their own community.
Their transnational experience gave them a different vantage point from which to
view the culture of their own country: they had felt less constrained as women and
become more critical of attitudes at home and the restrictions on women’s work
options. Blanchet (2005a) suggests that migration abroad entails an ‘irreversible
process of individuation’ for Bangladeshi women: ‘out of desh and out of family
purview, without guardians and without support, but also with a new freedom
they experience themselves as individuals. They had made difficult decisions, coped
with hardships, bore secrets regarding what could and could not be revealed at
home …’ (p.123). Many had begun their migrant careers by getting cheated, reacting
and learning rapidly how to safeguard their interests: ‘That is why their experience
of migration, on balance, is positive’ (p.124).
A similar widening of horizons is reported by Pagaduan’s study of Filipina migrants
(2006). The women migrants themselves acknowledged the contributions that their
period abroad had ‘on their self confidence, their adaptability and flexibility to apply
themselves to unknown situations and unfamiliar surroundings’ (p.79). For some of
them, ‘work abroad has provided the opportunity to escape from otherwise
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oppressive personal and cultural circumstances that might have otherwise trapped
them forever in lives of subordination and subjugation. Living abroad and exposure
to different cultures has immensely widened women workers’ worldviews’ (p.79).
They had learnt to live independently, to interact with others and many had formed
their own organisations. 
Salvadorian women in the US, many of whom had experience of paid work before
migration, felt less ‘watched’ and abroad than they did back at home. ‘While they
often found the new environment difficult or challenging to negotiate, and their
reconstituted roles a source of insecurity or discomfort, being forced to function in
it also resulted in feelings of increased confidence and self-assuredness’ (Zentgraf
2002: 636). They also believed that the law in the US was on the side of women
when it came to domestic violence: ‘Imagine, you can say that your husband is 
mistreating you and then they’ll take part in the issue. There [in El Salvador] they
can leave you all bruised and hidden, and nobody can find out’ (p.639). 
5 The commodification of love and 
sex in the global economy
5.1 The politics of marriage and the rise of the mail order bride
industry
While the demand for paid services in care and housework is largely generated by
women seeking to purchase substitute labour to take over their own unpaid respon-
sibilities within the household, the market demand for sex and marriage is largely
generated by men who, for a variety of reasons, are willing to pay for emotional
and sexual services that have conventionally been provided on an unpaid basis with-
in the social relations of marriage. And it is largely women and girls who provide
the supply of these services, although the percentage of men and boys appears to
be increasing and is certainly larger than generally documented. We focus here on
the mail order bride phenomenon before turning in the next section to the trade in
sex work. 
The trade in mail order brides began in the 1960s and has grown since. Mail-Order
Brides have been described ‘as a “modern form” of mediated marriage arrange-
ments which have been practiced since early times in many societies’ (Kojima 2001:
199). Customary matchmaking is generally conducted for compatriots or individuals
of the same nationality either through informal networks of family, friends and 
distant relatives or formally through the services of paid professional matchmakers.
The rise in the mail order bride phenomenon represents the growing commer-
cialisation of this search for partners. New forms of advertising for marital partners
through newspapers, magazines and the internet allowed men and women to
expand their search beyond the circle of friends, acquaintances and traditional
matchmakers and beyond national borders. The growth of the mail order bride
industry has been enabled by some of the same factors which have driven globalisa-
tion in other sectors of the economy: the spread of computerised technology,
advances in communication systems and increasing international mobility of people.
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The early demand came primarily from men in the advanced industrialised countries
of Europe, North America and Australia while the supply of women came mainly
from South East Asia. By the 1980s, the demand and supply patterns had diversified
with demand now also emanating from the wealthier countries of East Asia, 
mainly Japan and Taiwan, while the sources of supply now also include Latin
America and Eastern Europe. Some countries, like Japan, are both a source of mail
order brides, as Japanese women seek husbands from the West, as well as gener-
ating demand from Japanese men seeking wives from East and South East Asia. 
The steady rise in the demand for mail order brides reflects, at least in part, some
of the tensions and contradictions associated with the large-scale entry of women
into paid work and their growing financial independence. As we described earlier,
men have responded to this phenomenon in a variety of ways. Among the more
negative reactions, we noted the reluctance to take on a fairer share of childcare
and domestic responsibilities, extra-marital affairs, alcoholism, withdrawal of
support to the family as well as abandonment of wives and children. In addition, it
is apparent that large numbers of men have turned to the mail order industry in
the belief that women from other cultures might conform more closely to 
traditional feminine roles. 
The difficulties of negotiating a fairer distribution of resources and responsibilities
within marriage may have also contributed to the supply of mail order brides. Some
women have coped with the double shift of paid and unpaid work by working
longer hours or relied on other family members or paid domestic help to share the
burden. Others have left their husbands to bring up children on their own. Some
younger women have sought to delay marriage in order to enjoy some of the 
benefits of having an independent income and freedom from domestic chores.
Others have opted not to marry at all, creating a pool of men from their own 
cultures who must seek brides elsewhere. And some have themselves turned to the
mail order option for husbands in the belief that men from other cultures might
have the desirable qualities that men from their own cultures lack. 
Evidence of shifting marital patterns and declining rates of fertility have been widely
discussed in advanced industrialised economies of Europe and North America and
we noted earlier the rising rates of divorce, female headship, single motherhood in
Latin America and Africa as well (see Bernard 2003; Bigombe and Khadiagala
2003; Jelin and Díaz-Moñoz 2003; and Cliquet 2003). Marital patterns are also
changing in South and South East Asia in unexpected ways. While here too there
has been a rise in divorce rates, more striking is the fact that the percentages of
women in their thirties and forties who remain unmarried has been rising more
rapidly than men, particularly in urban areas. This trend has been found in Japan,
Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines since the 1960s (Jones 2004;
Quah 2003). Given that these are all countries where marriage is regarded as a
universal norm and non-marriage an aberration, there is considerable debate as to
the explanation for this phenomenon. 
Quah (1998) suggests that it reflects the failure on the part of certain groups of
women and men to find suitable partners as a result of a number of developments
in the region, including rising levels of education and labour force participation
among women. The persistence of traditional attitudes about what makes a 
desirable bride or groom have left certain categories of women (the more educated
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who are reluctant to marry ‘down’) and men (the less educated who are reluctant
to marry ‘up’) ‘stranded’ in the marriage market. 
However, there are also other explanations which bear more closely on some of
the phenomena we have been describing in this paper. These suggest that the rise
in the percentages of women and men delaying marriage or not marrying at all
reflects changing life choices on their part. For men, particularly those in urban
areas, Jones (2003) argues that being single poses less of a problem than it 
previously did. Its increasing prevalence has made it less of an aberration. In 
addition, the practicalities of living can be met by continuing to live with their
families or by purchasing the services associated with marriage from street vendors,
fast food outlets, domestic servants and commercial sex workers. Furthermore,
intimate relationships outside marriage are now more acceptable in many of these
contexts. 
For women, on the other hand, the decision to delay marriage or not marry at all
appears to reflect a somewhat different set of considerations. These relate to
inflexibilities within marriage around the division of roles and responsibilities 
combined with the inhospitality of the work environment for working mothers and
the absence of any public support for childcare (Truong 1996; Jones 2003). The
appeal of marriage is certainly not enhanced for women by the cultural 
expectations in the region that women will continue to do most of the housework,
childcare and care of ageing in-laws, even if they work full time (ESCAP 1999).
Rising levels of divorce make marriage a less secure option for women while
attachment to the labour force represents an alternative form of insurance. In 
addition, the cultural image of marriage in the region is also likely to lessen its
appeal to many women.  Educated Chinese or Thai women may be growing less
tolerant of socially accepted patterns of men keeping mistresses or visiting brothels
and massage parlours, particularly in an era of HIV-AIDS (Jones 2004).
Unfavourable stereotypes of married life abound in the Japanese context: ‘One is of
the salary man who leaves early for the office, returning towards midnight from an
evening of business-related carousing, expecting his home-bound wife to deal with
all the household chores and raise the children … while giving little to her in terms
of intimacy. Another is of the kyioku mom (education mom) who devotes her entire
live to her child’s educational credential-gathering, seeking a vicarious sense of
achievement through her child, but who, we are now told, may be responsible for
many of the pathologies emerging in Japanese children’s behaviour (p.18). 
These various factors appear to have made marriage less appealing to women, even
in cultures where it was seen as the fulfilment of their destiny. This is particularly
likely to be the case for a generation of women who have other options. According
to Retherford et al. writing about ‘late and less marriage’ in Japan, ‘large propor-
tions of single persons, particularly women, live with their parents, contribute little
to household expenses while earning good salaries, and are able to enjoy a relative-
ly carefree and comfortable life style’ (Retherford et al. 2001: 98). Survey data 
confirm that there has been a marked shift in attitudes (cited in Jones 2004). A
survey from the late eighties showed a sharp fall in the proportion of Japanese
women who felt that ‘women ought to marry as their happiness lay in marriage’
and a sharp increase in the proportion expressing discontent with the traditional
division of labour between husbands and wives. 1994 data reported that young
Japanese women viewed the institution of marriage far more negatively than men.
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In Korea, changing attitudes were evident in the results of a 1994 survey which
found that while over 50 per cent of men and around 40 per cent of women in
the 50–54 age group disagreed with the proposition that women could have a full
and satisfying life without marriage compared to only 13 per cent of women aged
25–29. 
5.2 Fantasies about ‘the other’ in the mail order industry
The growth in the global mail order bride industry appears to be linked to these
various and contradictory shifts in relationships between women and men within
different national contexts. One strand of the demand for mail order brides comes
from men ‘stranded’ in local marriage markets who are turning to commercial
arrangements to find brides from other countries. For instance, in rural areas in
northern Japan, the absence of any stake in the land and the unwillingness to take
on the hard physical labour on farms together with the appeal of jobs in the city
led many young women from these areas to migrate to urban areas, leaving a
severe shortage of women in the marriageable age group. Elsewhere, the ‘missing
women’ phenomenon and the resulting shortage of brides in parts of India, China,
Taiwan and South Korea has led to a growing trade in brides within and across
national borders (Blanchet 2005b; Tsay 2004; Zhao 2003; Duong et al. 2005; Kaur
2004). And finally, a more generalised source of the demand for mail order brides
reflects the search on the part of men for wives who are likely to be amenable to
a more traditional division of roles and responsibilities (Truong 1983: 538; Kojima
2001). 
The kind of men who advertise for mail order brides varies according to the factors
which gave rise to their demand. The ‘stranded’ categories of men tend to be 
characterised by some form of disadvantage relating to rural location, age, lack of
education, poverty, disability or simply a poor reputation. They are seeking brides
who can carry out the roles and responsibilities ascribed to women within 
marriage. In addition to bearing and looking after children and other family 
members (ageing in-laws feature a great deal in the Asian literature), it may also
include agricultural labour on the farm or family enterprise. Practical considerations
dominate this end of the commercialised marriage market (Piper 2003; Kaur 2004). 
In other sections of the market, these practical needs appear to be strongly overlaid
by romantic as well as erotic fantasies. The picture emerging from studies of male
clients of mail order websites in the US found them to be educated, in their late
thirties, predominantly white, financial successful and politically and ideologically
conservative. The reasons why such men would seek women from poorer countries
as their wives and sexual partners, according to Hothschild and Ehrenreich (2003),
are because they are though to embody the traditional feminine qualities of nurtu-
rance, docility and eagerness to please and thus resonate with nostalgia on the part
of many men for a bygone way of life. As they point out, ‘Even as many wage-
earning Western women assimilate to the competitive culture of “male” work and
ask for respect for making it in a man’s world, some men seek in the “exotic
Orient” or “hot-blooded tropics” a woman from the imagined past’ (p.10). 
However, as they go on to add, the women from the ‘exotic Orient’ or the ‘hot
blooded tropics’ who register with mail order agencies are not necessarily driven by
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economic desperation. MOBs are drawn from all social spectra and many have 
college education and internet access. They include comfortable middle class
women perceiving a shortage of suitable mates in their own societies as well as
extremely poor women seeking to escape intolerable lives. In many cases, the 
supply of mail order brides reflects the failure on the part of the women in 
question to challenge the patriarchal restrictions of their own societies. For
instance, Takahashi (cited in Piller, forthcoming) found that it was their serious 
dissatisfaction with Japanese society, and particularly with Japanese men, and their
experience of severe bullying or divorce from a cheating partner that led large
numbers of Japanese women to pursue the mail order option. 
In seeking partners abroad, MOBs have their own fantasies about what they seek.
Increased cultural exchanges, particularly cultural exports emanating from such 
cultural production centres as Hollywood, Bollywood and the international music
industry have shaped cross-cultural desires. For instance, images of Tom Cruise,
David Beckham and Brad Pitt featured a great deal in the decision of many of the
Japanese women who sought Western partners. The cultural stereotypes which
pervade the desires expressed by the men and women who turn to the mail order
bride option are well brought out in a study by Piller (forthcoming) which carried
out a content analysis of mail order websites which sought Filipina brides for
Western men. A number of different dimensions could be disentangled in the
cross-cultural desires featuring on these websites. The first dimension related to
representations of western men and what they desired in a relationship: 
This site caters to the classical American gentleman. Men who understand that
man and women are different, and someone a lot smarter than us made us
different for very good reasons. What you are looking for is someone 100%
loyal and who fulfils all the other roles a traditional wife fills. 
The second dimension consisted of representations of Western women and why
they did not constitute satisfactory partners. Western women were represented as
‘liberated’ (always in quotations marks), selfish, aggressive and materialistic:
I know many of you are tired of the U.S. or Canadian singles scene like I was.
You know … insincere girls who like to play games or expect constant material
gifts … Don’t settle for a demanding and unappreciative woman. The age of
the internet has opened up a whole new world of opportunity. It’s time you
meet the woman you truly deserve. Life is too short to settle for a ‘6’ when
you can have a ‘10’. (manilabeauty.com) 
A third dimension consisted of representations of what made Filipina women a ‘10’
rather than a ‘6’. This was defined, implicitly and explicitly, by their difference to
Western women:
… these Asian ladies are honest, faithful, rarely lose their figures as they age,
are extremely supportive and care more about your heart than your wallet. For
them, nice guys finish first! I know it was for me. 
What I found is that women from the Philippines … are more compatible with
American gentlemen than American women … I’ve seen an understanding of
the social order from Philippine people that I’ve not seen in any American
younger than 60 or 70 years old. What this means is the Philippine people
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teach social and family skills that Americans have abandoned. But not all
Americans. There are still plenty of American men who appreciate and desire
those skills and understanding. 
However, for mail order sites catering for specific nationalities, it was not sufficient
to extol the virtues of their specific ‘products’, they must also find a competitive
edge over their competitors. Representations of Filipina women thus also encom-
passed what they offered over other Asian women: 
Our personal opinion reflects the fact that Filipina women stand out among
Asian women in terms of charms, openness, intelligence, education and 
trustworthiness. In addition, Filipina women make excellent wives and they
excel and value their husbands as their priority. They are very affectionate and
romantic, and their focus and goals is giving their man tender loving care, 
surpasses all the women in South East Asia …
However, the strongest selling points of Filipinas over other Asian women as far as
Western men were concerned was their cultural affinity in terms of their
Christianity, their ability to speak English and their behaviour:
We are different from most Asian cultures. We are loyal to family unit more
than country. We are comfortable loving and marrying men of other race,
while most Asians ‘lose face’ if (they) marry outside their own culture … Marry
a Filipina and you do not have to eat with chopsticks or bow all the time. 
The final dimensions of these advertisements were representations of Filipino men
and how they differed from Western men:
We, being Filipinas in general, think of Western men, particularly Western
European and North American men as God-fearing, hardworking and 
deserving of love, respect and admiration. Please understand this the right way,
but frankly we take pleasure in being submissive to the reasonable demands of
our husband. Western men make us feel comfortable and even protected so
we naturally look to Western men for high moral and spiritual integrity … too
many boys here are playboy, drinker, gambler and abuser …
Similar representations feature in websites offering brides from other parts of the
world. As women from the former Soviet Union emerge as a new supply of mail
order brides, they too have to be marketed in culturally stereotyped terms (Hughes
2004). A 1995 issue of Moscow Times carried the following statement from the
owner of a mail order service offering Russian brides to Western men:
The attraction of Russian girls is that they are not so feminized, not so business
minded, they think about home, kids and their appearance. Western women
want to have careers, demand cash, have expensive divorces, but Russian
women are very pretty, there are plenty of them, they’re not spoiled and not
too demanding.
(Cited in Hughes 2004)
A website linking Russian brides to Norwegian men harked back to what
Norwegian women used to be like:
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Norwegian women are very independent ... (they) do not need men any more
… I am hoping the Russian women will be more like Norwegian women used
to be – keeping the home nice and looking after the family.
(Bhattacharya 2000 cited in Hughes 2004) 
The main competitive edge that Russian women appear to provide over their Asian
competitors is that along with the family values, they are white: ‘a European face
but the patience of an Asian’ (cited in Piller forthcoming). The Sydney Morning
Herald Magazine described Russian mail order brides: ‘here are exotic white women
who know their place’ (cited in Piller, forthcoming).
Explanations to Western customers as to why Russian women might be eager to
marry them put forward negative stereotypes which play to the very real problems
of alcoholism, unemployment and domestic violence among Russian men.
According to the web-based European Connections:
(Russian women’s) views of relationships have not been ruined by feminism.
Russians are enamoured with everything Western, especially American, and the
ladies consider it quite an honour to have a Western boyfriend … (Western
men) represent everything a Russian man is not: sophisticated, energetic, 
financially secure and SOBER … all seek to extent friendship from … the dark-
ness of an ‘outdoor prison’ to the daylight of the open, free West.
(Moscow Times 1995, cited in Hughes 2004)
Elsewhere it was reported that
The reasons (women) give (for signing up with the bride agencies) are that men
of their country are extremely lazy alcoholics who beat their women.
(Cengal 1999) 
This route to finding marriage partners is not without problems. As Visson (1998)
observes, those that advertise on mail order websites view themselves as individuals
but tend to see their spouses in cultural-stereotypical terms, representatives of cul-
tural categories, setting up the strong likelihood of failed expectations on the part
of both. The mismatch of expectations is pointed out in one study of mail order
brides from Colombia, Philippines and Russia:
Our interviews captured the irony of situations in which women who were
attempting to escape … traditional constraints were being matched with men
who were attempting to find a wife whom they believed would embrace this
same lifestyle … Thus the MOB business as it now operates may be in the 
perverse position of attempting to match independent, non-traditional women
with very traditional Western men.
(Minervini and McAndrew 2006: 115) 
Furthermore, the organisation of the mail order bride industry lends itself to high
levels of abuse and coercion. Some NGOs regard the bride trade to be a form of
trafficking in women because so much of its operation depends on the unequal
positioning of men and women within the global system. Profits are generated
through the recruitment of women from regions of poverty and high unemploy-
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ment and marketing them on the basis of sexual, racial and ethnic stereotypes to
men in higher income countries. The danger of entering abusive relations through
the mail order route is high.
The mail order bride industry is poorly regulated and most of the regulations
aim to prevent immigration fraud rather than protecting the women who
enter a country as mail order brides, and who are dependent on their new
husband in many ways, not least for their residency status. Unsurprisingly, the
incidence of domestic violence in such marriage is higher than in marriages
resulting from other encounters.
(Piller, forthcoming) 
Finally, while the market for mail order brides is, in principle, distinct from the 
market in the various services provided by unskilled female labour in the care, 
cleaning or sex industry, the globalisation of these markets and the concentration
of their labour supply in the poorer countries of the world have meant that, 
particularly at the more hazardous, undocumented end of the market, there is a
considerable, often involuntary, slippage between these markets. Illustrating this
slippage is evidence that many men view the romance tours offered by mail order
agencies as simply sex tours. Moreover, a number of websites are fully integrated
into the sex industry so that the same site offers brides, escorts, pornography or
provide links to pornography sites. While men seeking companions and wives
through the mail order route may express a desire for women interested in fulfiling
traditional family roles, reviews of agency websites often reveal blatantly sexualised
photographs of the women used in their advertisements. In addition, some 
websites function as ‘shop-fronts’ for organised crime and lure women into 
prostitution. 
5.3 The politics of sexuality and the trade in sex work
The sex industry has been around for a long time, of course, but it has grown
explosively in recent decades. Rates of growth in the 1980s and 1990s were highest
in the world’s industrialised countries: Europe, the US, Australia and Japan but have
subsequently spread to other parts of the world. The global sex industry is estimat-
ed to have a turnover of between $5–$7000 billion, greater than the combined
military budget for the whole world (European Parliament, cited in Monzini. 2005).
Commercial sex is one of the leading economic sectors in South East Asia today.
For instance, the sex trade contributes around 14 per cent of Thailand’s GDP,
accounts for a major rise in employment and provides a valuable source of hard
currency. Its profitability reflects its fit with other expanding ‘Transnational’ sectors,
including tourism, the leisure industry and the whole travel market. There has been
a sharp increase in sex tourism: 2 million in 1981 to over 7 million in 1996. Two
thirds of tourists were unaccompanied men: nearly 5 million unaccompanied men
visited Thailand in 1996. 
Explanations for the persistence of the sex trade draw heavily on biological under-
standings of male sexuality as an ‘irrepressible urge’. As Lim (1998) points out, 
prostitution is explained by social beliefs that men are ‘naturally sexually active and
aggressive, but “respectable” women must maintain their chastity and honour’
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(p.12). The ‘safety valve’ version of this (D’Cunha 1997) was put forward, amongst
others, by Georg Simmel, an early twentieth century theorist, who suggested that
prostitution was related to the unnatural repression of male sexuality imposed by
the institution of monogamous marriage and which would otherwise be directed
against ‘innocent’ women. Prostitution would become obsolete once monogamy
became obsolete (Monzini 2005).
However, while repressive sexual norms combined with double standards about
male and female sexuality may explain the persistence of prostitution in some
regions of the world, this explanation is less plausible in others. As Monzini points
out, the onset of a more sexually permissive society since the 1960s, and the
greater willingness on the part of the general population of women as well as men
to engage in sex outside marriage in most Western societies, has not only failed to
end prostitution but has seen a rapid increase in its scale so that the global
turnover of the sex industry is estimated between $5–12 billion, larger than the
combined military budget for the whole world, more profitable than the trade in
drugs and arms (Monzini 2005: 24; Hughes 2005). The liberalisation of sexual mores
is evident instead in the nature of the market with rising involvement of transsexual
and transvestite prostitution and with more women willing to pay for sex (see
Jassey 2006 for an account of female purchase of male sexual services in the
Gambia). 
A more plausible set of explanations, and one with relevance for the themes of this
paper, attributes part of the explosive growth in the sex trade to the problematic
nature of present day relations between women and men. It points to the loss of
certainty about identity and place in society as a result of the redefinition of roles
and expectations currently under way. Given these changes, prostitution is seen to
represent ‘a special sphere in which men unsure of their capacity for relations with
the opposite sex can escape what they feel as a burden of responsibility’ (Monzini
2005: 10).
Some of the interviews carried out with male clients of sex workers in a study in
Italy offer support for this explanation (Corso and Landi 1998 cited in Monzini
2005). One client, a man in his forties, said: ‘What I like most was the male 
chauvinist aspect of being able to choose without being rejected … It was great
choosing like a feudal lord and being absolutely sure you wouldn’t be rejected by
the other person’ (p.11). According to another client, a graduate executive: ‘I go with
these girls because I have been pushed into it by the feminist fashion that’s 
abolished traditional male-female relations. It makes me prefer a simple economic
negotiation over the price of a service, instead of getting involved in relations
which are too cerebral (and therefore turn me off sexually) or too physical (and
therefore expose my great limits as a male … Women’s demands have grown and
grown; they’ve become more and more difficult and complicated for us men’
(Corso and Landi 1998 cited in Monzini 2005 p.11). The rapid growth of tourism, as
Monzini notes, allows the possibility of travel to faraway places in the search by
men for ‘islands’ in which they can defend – ‘or at least have the illusion of defend-
ing’ – the status of male superiority in the face of women’s social skills and growing
qualifications, to be ‘king’ for at least a week (p.11: ‘Commercial sex provides escape
of a kind from increasing complexity of intimate relationships’. Chant and McIlwaine
(1995) offer insights into the some of the other motivations which lead foreign
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male tourists to seek out commercial sex in the Philippines: the need to prove 
sexual prowess to themselves and their peers, particularly as they approach middle
age, pressure from their peers, the belief that their own countries were ‘rife’ with
women who were ‘too demanding’ or ‘not feminine enough’ (p.226). 
However, the explosive growth of the sex industry has also been facilitated by the
sharp rise in disposable income across the world and the growth of a consumer
culture that is, as Ehrenreich (1987) puts it, ‘endlessly inventive in producing new
temptations and new rationales for yielding to them’. In an analysis that calls to
mind Polanyi’s (1944) warnings about the social consequences of untrammelled
market forces, Taylor and Jameison (1999) suggest that the rising consumption of
sexual services can be seen as part of the cultural changes brought about by the 
liberalisation of trade, the global spread of markets and the increasing reorganisa-
tion of social life and values around the ‘the sovereignty of the citizen as consumer,
endlessly caught up in the marketisation and consumption of new commodities’
(p.264).  Such an analysis fits with findings from a literature survey by Hughes
(2004) that men who paid for sex were not necessarily any lonelier, poorer or less
likely to have satisfactory sexual relationships than those who did not. They were
men in search of excitement, of sex without any relationship or responsibility, of
sexual encounters in which they exercised control and were free to degrade, 
humiliate and hurt as they wished. 
Whereas pornography and prostitution were once private and surreptitious 
activities, men are now solicited as never before to become consumers with the
internet and subscription television channels allowing greater and more discreet
access to services. Moreover, thanks to the internet, the industry has become more
diversified and sophisticated. In early 1995, there were around 200 websites selling
erotic services and products. It had risen to 28,000 by the end of 1997. In the
United States alone, pornographic material accounts for 60 per cent of all material
sold on the web while 70 per cent of the £252 million spent in Europe on the
internet went to the pornographic sites (Monzini 2005). The internet feeds the
exchange of information and services, giving rise to another set of racial/cultural
stereotypes which parallel those in the mail order bride industry: African and black
women become objects of desire for the ‘savage nature’; Asian women for their
submissiveness and willingness to please; Latin Americans for their passion;
Europeans for their lack of inhibitions and young girls for their freshness and 
docility (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003). 
Women who enter the sex trade, like working women everywhere, are propelled
by a variety of forces. For those who live in situations of great hardship and precari-
ousness, migration into sex work may be perceived as their only opportunity to
escape poverty. Women in the sex trade are largely drawn from the poorer
countries of the world and from poorer sections of their populations. With the 
collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and Russia, the spread of prostitution
appears to have been one of the most immediate effects of the turn to the market
economy. On the other hand, as Monzini points out, ‘The same globally shared 
consumer myths and mechanisms’ that lead clients to obtain sex on a monetary
basis operate to make others prepared to enter the market as sellers of sexual 
services’ (2005, p.20). The more acceptable is the commodification of sex within
the global economy, the more acceptable it becomes as means for those with 
services to sell to participate in an increasingly global consumer culture. 
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This means that while there may be significant overlaps between trafficking and the
commercial sex industry, it is important to distinguish between those who entered
sex work of their own volition, those who were deceived into it, or about the 
conditions associated with it and those who were coerced into it (Hennink and
Simkhada 2004).
As McClintock (1993) points out: ‘Depicting all sex workers as slaves only travesties
the myriad, different experiences of sex workers around the world. At the same
time, it theoretically confuses social agency and identity with social context’ (cited in
Brennan 2003: p.155).
A considerable degree of agency is displayed by the women in Brennan’s study of
the Dominican Republic who had migrated to a nearby tourist town to work in sex
trade. The most decisive factor propelling many of these women into sex trade was
their status as single mothers bringing up their children on their own. Most had
migrated within days of partners’ departure from the household and abandonment
of financial obligations to children. They left their children behind with female 
relatives, visiting when they could. Sex work paid more than domestic service and
export-processing factories, the two other economic options available to women:
women could charge 500 pesos for each sexual encounter while they earned
around 1,000 pesos a month from these other jobs. Their reasons for entering sex
work was to improve their chances in life rather than as a survival strategy. Many
hoped that sex work in a tourist town would allow them to meet foreign men
who would sponsor their migration to Europe in a Dominican version of Pretty
Woman. Feigning love appeared to be far less risky than some of the other means
by which people left the island but as Brennan (2003) concludes, exits from poverty
were rarely as permanent as the sex workers hoped (p.168). 
Bandopadhyay’s account of women in Calcutta’s sex industry shows that unwanted
arranged marriages, violent husbands and betrayal by lovers were among the factors
that explained their entry into the trade. Gangoli (2006) notes the existence of
‘flying sex workers’, including middle class housewives and students, who come to
Calcutta’s red light area to do sex work from nearby villages and suburbs to ply the
trade for the evening or the day. In her study of the casual daily labour market in
Mumbai, Shah (2006) reports that women who failed to find wage labour in the
morning turned to sex work in the afternoon to ensure their daily earning. Their
preference for construction work over sex work appeared to be related to the
lower levels of police harassment associated with the former occupation rather
than with any moral considerations on their part. 
Studies from south east Asia report that young female school leavers moving from
rural to urban areas to earn an income often move into sex work, which generally
pays more than the alternative jobs available to them, in order to afford the kind of
lifestyle and nightlife that they had hoped to find in the city (Lim 1998). The line
between choice and coercion begins to blur in the case of young women who
enter sex work as a means of fulfiling their filial duties to the parents who brought
them up. Some are ‘sold’ into prostitution by parents, but accept it as a way of
paying back their debt to parents (Surtees 2003). However, Bales (2003) suggests
that these practices shade into coercion. He notes that among some of the poorer
tribal groups living in the northern hills of Thailand, the sale of daughters into sex
work or domestic service in the southern plains of the country is not new: ‘In the
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culture of the north, it was a life choice not preferred, but acceptable and one that
was used regularly. In the past, these sales fed into a small, steady flow of servants,
workers and prostitutes south into Thai society’ (p.210). 
However, this flow has become a flood as a result of uneven industrialisation,
which left the northern regions behind, combined with increasing culture of
consumerism across the society. A recent survey in the Northern Province found
that two thirds of the families who had ‘sold’ their daughters could have afforded
not to do so, but preferred to buy colour televisions and video equipment. The 
contractual arrangement between the broker and parents require the money paid
to the parents be repaid to the broker by the women’s labour before they are free
to leave or allowed to send money home. The women so purchased are required to
have sex with sufficient numbers of men every night to pay off what they cost as
well as contribute to their board, lodging and health care. 
The line between choice and coercion is also difficult to draw in the case of young
women from the former Soviet Union whose desperation for a better life leads
them to leave their country in tens of thousands every year for destinations all over
the world. Confronted by ‘help-wanted ads specifying hip and bust measurements’
in local newspapers (Bienefeld et al. nd), driven by poverty, unemployment and
media images of affluent Western lifestyles, these women accept dubious offers of
employment and marriage in the hope of finding a better life. Many end up in the
sex industry, some in the hands of traffickers. In some parts of the world such as
Israel and Turkey, women from Russia and other republics of the former Soviet
Union are so common in the sex trade that prostitutes are called Natashas (Hughes
2000). 
Non-governmental organisations report that economic hard times have lowered
the psychological barriers that these women might have had to such work along
with their self esteem and their hopes for the future. Once a woman has decided
that the solutions to her problems is to go abroad, ‘she will try every agency or
strategy, regardless of the risk.’ (Hughes 2001: 49). As one young woman said: ‘I
want to live separately from my parents. I want to buy things. I’m sick and tired of
everything. Why should it be a bad experience. I will go illegally. I will be fine. Even
if it is not easy, I will try …’ (cited in Hughes 2004: 1). Women accept unlikely offers
of unskilled jobs at high salaries with the resignation that ‘it cannot be worse’ than
their present lives. 
Recruiting agencies tend to target the most economically depressed areas in the
region while the media blackout leaves women with little information on what can
happen to them. Interviews with 160 young women from the southern oblasts of
Ukraine, where there has been high recruitment by ‘marriage agencies’ found that
two thirds of them wanted to go abroad, of whom 40 per cent said they knew
there was a risk of being forced into prostitution but ‘were sure it would not 
happen to them’. 
According to Interpol-Ukraine, the majority of women who set off for jobs abroad
do not realise they are being recruited for prostitution. It is only when they reach
their destination that they are informed that they will not be working as a nanny or
a waitress. However, even those who do know where they will be working, do not
know the nature of the conditions they will be working under. Hughes (2000) cites
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a Russian newspaper article on a young woman who was expecting a Pretty
Woman style Hollywood ending, being supported by a single man. They only find
out later about the lack of control they will have, the debt bondage, the confisca-
tion of travel documents, the violence used to ensure their compliance, the threats
to family members and the small percentage of their earnings that they will actually
receive. For many, the only way to escape the brutality of being forced to have
unwanted sex with multiple men every day is to move from victim to perpetrator:
70 per cent of pimps in Ukraine, according to one report, are women (Hughes
2000).
Trafficking in women within the global sex trade has become a multi-billion dollar
‘shadow market’ but of an unknown magnitude: ‘The trade is secretive, the women
are silenced, the traffickers are dangerous and not many agencies are counting’
(Hughes 2000: 2). It is at this end of the sex trade that commodification of the
kind described by Polanyi appears to be taken to its logical extreme and the person
becomes the commodity that is bought and sold in the marketplace. The violation
this represents to acceptable norms of human behaviour is evident in the question
asked by an Ukrainian woman who had been trafficked, beaten, raped, put to work
in the sex industry in Israel, rescued by the police and then gaoled till her deporta-
tion: ‘Can people really buy and sell women and get away with it? Sometimes I sit
here and ask myself if that really happened to me, if it can really happen at all’ (New
York Times, 11 January 1998). 
6 Changing notions of marriage, 
motherhood and masculinity in 
the global economy 
6.1 The crisis in social reproduction
As the analysis in this paper has sought to demonstrate, the large-scale entry of
women into paid work across an increasing global economy is having major ramifi-
cations for the way in which women, men and children live their lives today. It 
raises a number of important theoretical issues and policy challenges that need to
be investigated through forms of comparative research that can no longer be 
compartmentalised as ‘development studies’. Seers’s vision of employment as a
source of dignity and self-realisation for human beings remains as relevant today as
it was in his time, but as an increasingly distant goal rather than a description of
the current reality. It is rather Polanyi’s analysis of the social consequences of self-
regulating markets, disembedded from societal controls, that captures the 
important aspects of the global economy today. However, while increasing 
proportions of the world’s population now earn their living through the sale of
their labour, it is clear that the processes of commodification have been 
experienced very differently by women and men in different parts of the world,
thus ruling out any easy generalisations about their transformative potential for
women’s lives. While the current generation of working men face more informal
IDS WORKING PAPER 290
48
conditions in the labour market than did their forefathers, as a group, they continue
to enjoy a larger share of employment and earnings than do women. Working
women have benefited most clearly in contexts where they were previously denied
economic opportunities or where they have seen an expansion and diversification
of their work opportunities. They have benefited less clearly where protections at
work have deteriorated, where their opportunities have contracted or where their
entry into the labour market represented a ‘distress sale’ of labour. 
In addition, it is evident from the discussion in this paper that men’s responses have
played a role in shaping women’s experience of work. While it is evident that many
men in many contexts have welcomed women’s ability to share their breadwinning
responsibilities, it is equally evident that others have found the adjustment difficult,
particularly in contexts where they have seen their own economic options stagnant
or declining. Such men have responded in a variety of ways including refusal to
share domestic and childcare responsibilities to drinking, violence, withdrawal of
their financial contributions, divorcing their wives, abandoning their families, taking
second wives or returning to their natal families. It has been largely husbands rather
than fathers, brothers or sons who have responded in this way, drawing attention
to the precariousness of the balance of power within marital relations and its
reliance on the appearance, if not the fact, of women’s economic dependence. 
The failure of the feminisation of paid work to eradicate gender hierarchies within
the labour market may explain why so many women, faced only with the prospect
of casual, irregular and poorly paid jobs, have colluded in upholding male authority
and the privileges that go with it, including male exemption from housework.
However, it has also led to resentment on the part of others as they struggle to
reconcile their socially ascribed domestic responsibilities with their increasing
responsibilities as household breadwinners. The diverse microlevel negotiations
through which women and men struggle to come to terms with the implications
of women’s increased breadwinning roles, and the widespread resistance by men to
assuming a fairer share of unpaid domestic work, seems to have contributed to an
increase in the demand for paid female labour in services hitherto provided through
the unpaid relations of marriage and family. On the one hand, it has generated a
demand by working women with children and other dependents for hired female
labour to take up some of their unpaid workload. On the other, it has generated by
a demand by men of all ages for the commercial provision of love, companionship
and sexual services, often targeting women from other cultures who are considered
more accommodating, more dependent and less ‘feminist’ that women from their
own cultures. Both these demands are increasingly met by women migrants from
lower income countries and from countries undergoing the traumas of transition
from plan to market. 
There has not been a great deal of attention in the development literature on the
‘feminisation of labour’ to this growing commodification of care, love and sex or to
the accompanying rise in levels of trafficking, which make up the ‘the dark under-
belly of globalisation’. Studies of trafficking tend to be carried out under a human
rights rubric rather than in the context of labour market analysis, but they bear out
Polanyi’s (1944) warnings about the consequences of the logic of the unfettered
commodification of human beings. It is an indicator of their greater vulnerability
that women and children make up a disproportionate share of these ‘victims of
acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation’ (p.73). 
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The growing commodification of female labour has also served to bring the 
problematic nature of ‘care work’ to the forefront of feminist analysis. Despite the
widespread acknowledgement that the care and love that children receive has 
significant implications for the kind of adult workers, citizens and human beings
they will become, the work that mothers do tends to be taken for granted by 
society and devalued by the market: ‘When performed by mothers, we call this
mothering … when performed by hired hands, we call it unskilled’ (Katz Rothman
1989: 42 cited in Parrenas 2000). 
Mothers do not expect to get paid because the work they do is an expression of
love: they ‘care about’ their families as well as ‘caring for’ them. However, the work
involved makes considerable demands on their time and energy. The evidence cited
in this paper suggests that they receive very little support for it from male family
members. There is clearly something about masculinity as identity in many parts of
the world that makes men deeply uncomfortable about taking on care work, even
within the privacy of their own homes. It may be that their sense of manhood is
jeopardised at some deep psychological level,10 it may be that their claims on paid
labour as a male preserve will weaken if they start to share in domestic and parent-
ing responsibilities (Chant 2002 a and b) or it may be that they are simply protect-
ing the remaining vestiges of masculine identity in a world where women are
increasingly encroaching on their breadwinning roles: if they must share in domestic
work when women take up breadwinning roles, what will be left to distinguish
them from women? 
Nor do women find much public policy support for their care responsibilities.
Instead, the thrust of public policy in recent decades has been in the opposite direc-
tion. As we noted at the outset, the pursuit of flexible markets and the need to
compete in the global economy has led to the dismantling of welfare provision and
labour market regulation where these existed and to their active discouragement
elsewhere. Key elements of collective provisioning, including health, education and
social security, have been privatised in principle to markets in these goods and 
services. But where these markets do not exist or are unaffordable, responsibility
for welfare provision has devolved to the family, and more particularly, to the 
invisible and unpaid labour of women. The privatisation of social services has thus
added to women’s unpaid work burdens at a time when the informalisation of
employment has made men’s breadwinning capacity increasingly uncertain, forcing
women from their households to take up paid work to make ends meet. 
The quote from Gita Sen at the start of this paper can be used to make a strong
argument about the benefits of taking women’s reproductive responsibilities 
seriously in policies intended to promote pro-poor growth and human development
(see, for instance, Kabeer 2003). The analysis in this paper draws attention to the
costs of not doing so. The supply of affective labour by women, apparently assumed
10 For instance, Risseuw (1991) notes in the context of research in Sri Lanka that the principle 
that men are ‘higher’ than their wives permeate the actions, thoughts and emotions of
both women and men. Handling dirt, faeces, cleaning toilets, being impure, doing repetitive
and relatively less prestigious work, which often lacks the status of work are seen as the 
female expression of the principle of gender hierarchy. Not surprisingly, she reports that 
men cannot ‘stoop down’ to such activities without experiencing severe emotional stress. 
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by policymakers to be endlessly elastic (Elson 1991), has been stretched to breaking
point by the dual pressures of care and work for many women. It is clearly snapping
for many others, leading to declining rates of marriage and fertility as well as
increasing numbers of women who opt to remain childless. It is in this sense we
can talk about the emerging crisis in social reproduction, although the form it has
taken varies across the world. 
In many industrialised countries, it has taken the form of a ‘birth strike’. The fall in
fertility rates to below net replacement levels in some of these countries has been
serious enough to warrant newspaper headlines about fears of de-population. Italy
has drawn particular attention in this literature because, despite having one of the
more traditionally pro-natalist cultures in Europe, its fertility rates today are among
the lowest in the Western world, with growing percentages of women opting to
remain childless.11 Studies exploring this decline in fertility rates in Italy highlight the
importance of domestic division of unpaid labour as a critical factor. For instance,
Tenturri and Mencarini (2005) found that Italian women were more likely to opt to
have a second child if their husbands shared in childcare tasks. Of women who had
opted to remain childless, subsidised childcare and paid maternity leave were the
two policy measures most likely to persuade them to consider having a child. It is
evident that private decisions which impinge on processes of social reproduction
are taken in the context of public policies that influence how the costs and benefits
of such decisions are likely to be distributed. Italy spends 3.5 per cent of its GDP on
child related social spending compared to an EU average of 8 per cent. At the
other end of the social spending spectrum, the Nordic countries report the para-
doxical combination of higher fertility rates than much of Europe combined with
higher levels of female labour force participation. 
Statistics from different regions of the world, both developed and developing, all
testify to major shifts in patterns of marriage, motherhood and family life, including
rising rates of divorce, declining fertility rates, the postponement of marriage,
refusal to marry, the spread of consensual or visiting unions in place of formal 
marriage, female-headed households, same sex marriages, sibling based families,
multi-generational families, single person households and the transnationalisation of
families and motherhood.12 Clearly not all the changes observed can be attributed
to the phenomena discussed in this paper: war, political disturbances, forced 
migration, internal displacements and the spread of HIV-AIDS have also played a
role. Nevertheless, the paper has argued that the expansion of economic opportu-
nities for women, together with rising levels of education, the spread of contracep-
tive technology and high levels of exposure to new values and aspirations in an
11 This led Roberto Marconi, labour and welfare minister in the Berlusconi government, to 
offer 1,000 euros to every woman who had a second child. The Mayor of Laviano (where 
only four babies were born in 2002) increased the amount to 10,000 euros over five years 
for every additional baby (www.telegraph.co.uk accessed 18 April 2004).
12 Some of these changes are statistically documented in the regional overviews of family 
structures produced for United Nations Division for Social and Economic Affairs 
(www.un.org/esa/socdev/family/Publications accessed 12 November 2006). Jelin and Diaz-
Monoz (2003); Badran (2003); Qua (2003); Cliquet (2003); De Silva (2003); El-Haddad 
(2003); Bernard (2003); Bigombe and and Khadiagala (2003); Nosseir (2003).
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increasingly connected world have combined to open up new possibilities for how
they live their lives and the kinds of families they want to it live in. 
These changes in the patterns of family life, and the growing deviations they repre-
sent from whatever constituted the ideal family type in different contexts, have led
to an emerging discourse about the ‘crisis in the family’ (see Moore 1994; Chant
2002). However, the greater diversity of family forms does not necessarily speak of
a decline in the significance of the family, once it is accepted that the boundaries of
the household are not necessarily co-terminous with the boundaries of the family.
The evidence cited in this paper speaks of the continued importance of family ties
in the lives of women and men in variety of different ways: the return to the natal
family in the event of marital breakdown; the reliance by female household heads
on wider kinship support; the formation of multi-generational families to cope with
crisis and recession; the role of grandmothers and other extended family members
in caring for the children of working mother, including those who have migrated
and so on. 
As Jelin and Díaz-Moñoz (2003) point out, the discourse of ‘the family in crisis’ is
most strongly articulated by those for whom there is only one ideal family type: ‘the
monogamous heterosexual couple and their children, established for once and for
all’. They suggests that what we may be observing is not such much a crisis in the
family as a crisis in patriarchal authority within the family and the transition to more
democratic family forms, to families of ‘choice’ rather than fate. However, the tran-
sition is not a costless one and choice is not its only driving force. Female house-
hold heads may have greater control over the resources that they generate, and
devote a greater share of their resources to the welfare of their children, but they
also tend to be disproportionately represented among the poorer sections of the
population. Similarly, the growing numbers of elderly people who live alone may do
so out of choice and a desire for independence – single person households in the
Latin American context are far more frequent in upper income groups – or it may
reflect the hardships endured by families in lower income strata and their inability
to care for all their dependents. 
The evidence cited in this paper does speak more directly to the ‘crisis in masculini-
ty’ discourse (see Chant 2000; Nurse 2004). It is clear that the automatic privileges
associated with the role of the primary breadwinner can no longer be taken for
granted in the face of stagnating employment opportunities for men and of the
greater willingness or ability of women to find paid work. The spread of feminist
ideas through the media, through development interventions and through feminist
activism is also likely to have contributed to the greater willingness of women to
press for greater justice in family life and to take the ‘exit’ option from abusive, 
violent or unfair relationships with men. 
It is also clear that it is largely men from poorer and less privileged groups who are
most affected by the ‘crisis in masculinity’ since they are least able to live up to
hegemonic models of masculinity which promote the idea of men as the power
brokers, providers and household heads of society. To that extent, they are as
oppressed by the absence of multiple models of masculinity as women are by the
secondary status assigned to them. Nurse (2004) points to the costs imposed on
men by the pressures to live up to social expectations: decline in their breadwinning
roles has been accompanied by a loss of self-esteem and associated problems of
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marital and domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse. Möller-Leimkuhler (2003)
draws attention to the high rates of suicide and premature death13 among men
compared to women, particularly among the young and middle aged. Ratios of
committed (as opposed to attempted) suicides by females to males is around 1:2 in
Western societies rising to a high of 1:6 in the United States (Murphy 1998). WHO
data on youth suicides for 51 countries from around the world show that rates of
suicide for young men are almost invariably higher, sometimes considerably higher,
than those for young women.14 The largest disparities were to be found in the
Russian Federation where rates per 100,000 were 48.8 for men and 9.0 for
women. Germany with a median value reported 13.9 for men and 3.7 for women.
Higher male than female suicide rates were also noted for the few Asian and Latin
American countries included in the list. The ratio of male to female suicide rates
were: 11: 5.9 for the Republic of Korea; 25.1: 9.4 for Mauritius; 12:5.1 for Japan; 7.6:
2.4 for Chile and 5.9: 1.3 for Mexico. 
There are, of course, a variety of reasons why young men might kill themselves
with greater frequency than young women but Möller-Leimkuhler suggests that
‘Traditional masculinity is a key risk factor for male vulnerability promoting maladap-
tive coping strategies such as emotional inexpressiveness, reluctance to seek help or
alcohol abuse’. Her conclusion is based on studies from advanced industrialised and
transitional economies and it is possible that the forms of masculinity that prevail in
some of the contexts we have been discussing may allow men greater scope to
express themselves or seek help. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the disjuncture
between dominant forms of masculinity and what is available to men from lower
income households has brought out various forms of ‘maladaptive coping strategies’
which we have discussed in this paper. 
Möller-Leimkuhler’s comments throw an interesting light on some of the discussion
around policy responses to women’s unpaid work burdens to be found in the
recent literature. One set of suggestions focus on giving value to women’s unpaid
care work through citizenship entitlements. The ‘cash for care’ allowance promoted
by conservative parties in Norway is one example. Pearson (2000) questions this
approach on the grounds that it will do little to challenge the entrenched gender
division of labour within the domestic domain while Jackson (2000) suggests that
as long as there is a broad symmetry in the efforts that men and women invest in
the collective welfare of their families, there does not seem any obvious rationale
for insisting that they do identical tasks. However, in as much masculine notions of
self are premised on men’s distance from caring roles, one implication we can draw
from Möller-Leimkuhler’s analysis is that their greater involvement in these aspects
of work may help to break down some of the rigidities of male identity and lessen
their vulnerability. A greater caring role, in other words, may be good for men’s
health, well-being and life expectancy.
13 Due to coronary heart disease, violence, accidents, drug and alcohol abuse. 
14 Only four out of the 51 countries reported higher suicide rates among young women of
which only rural China reported markedly higher rates (33 compared to 16.7). A 1994 World 
Bank paper estimated that 30 per cent of the deaths among otherwise healthy rural 
Chinese women were due to suicide and suggests that the finding was consistent with 
reports of mass suicide in rural China among women forced or sold into unwanted (and 
often violent) marriage.
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6.2 The diverse strands of the counter-movement 
Whatever conclusions might be reached regarding the implications of women’s
large-scale entry into paid work for their personal lives and life choices, the contin-
ued informalisation of labour markets and working conditions raises questions
about the Polanyi’s hypothesis that counter-movements emerge to curtail the 
commodification of labour in the face of untrammelled market forces. This is clearly
a much greater challenge in a globalised economy in which capital is free to evade
any attempts to subject its actions to societal controls while labour, particularly
unskilled labour, faces restrictive, often punitive, controls over its mobility. 
In the domain of policy, the issue of social protection has been rising steadily up the
international development agenda in response to the anxieties generated by finan-
cial crises in different parts of the world. However, the concrete measures favoured
so far are premised on the view that integration into global markets offers the
most effective route to livelihood security. They offer little by way of challenge to
the worst excesses of commodification and only piecemeal recognition of the 
synergies and trade-offs associated with women’s location at the crossroads of
production and reproduction. Efforts to argue for the universal provision of basic
welfare entitlements and subsidised care services which would allow all members
of society to build their lives and livelihoods on shared and guaranteed foundation
of security have tended to founder on the combined resistance of the international
financial institutions and the powerful neoliberal forces behind them. 
It is consequently in the domain of politics that the more radical challenges to
untrammelled commodification are to be found. The rise of neo-conservatism,
communitarianism and religious fundamentalisms one set of responses to the
uncertainties of the age and the valorisation of the past. Sections of the ‘green’
movement have sought to link the destruction of the environment and climate
change to the worst excesses of unregulated market forces. Other responses come
from the organised labour movement and its allies who have been divided between
those who opt for a protectionist stance to defend local jobs and those who seek
to contain the force of the free market through international solidarity. Feminists
have been too diverse in their responses to globalisation to lend themselves to a
single characterisation, but there has always been a strong internationalist strand to
the feminist movement, one that has sought to link women’s organisations across
the world in a common struggles against the darker aspects of globalisation. 
Debates about the nature of social protection suited to the global economy are
likely to continue into the foreseeable future since they are about the fundamental
values of different societies and groups. So too will debates about the implications
of paid work in women’s lives. It is clear that the contradictory nature of the
changes it has wrought in the lives of working women and men bear out the
analysis put forward by Elson and Pearson in their early work. New forms of
gender inequalities have indeed emerged as older ones have dissolved. The 
previously hidden racial, ethnic and gender segmentation of labour markets of an
earlier era have become more visible as they have become internationalised. 
However, it is also the case that women as economic actors are also more visible in
the public domain and more engaged in collective struggle than they have ever
been. The previous lack of organisation among women workers reflected the failure
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of traditional trade unions who had flourished in the era of the closed economy
and who had had restricted their efforts to the formal sector and to the standard
forms of employment in which male workers predominated.  Facing shrinking
membership and growing irrelevance, some of these organisations have begun to
reform themselves in order to reach out to workers in the informal economy. In
addition, new kinds of labour organisations promoted by women’s organisations
and networks, human rights groups, civil society activists and sometimes, political
parties, are also increasingly active on the global stage. 
While there have been moments of heightened activity by women throughout the
course of history on a variety of issues, the combined effects of globalisation in
connecting people, ideas and collective action have created an unprecedented 
political context for them to mobilise around their collective needs and interests.
Polanyi did not subscribe to the view that those who are most directly affected by
exposure to deregulated market forces will necessarily lead the counter-movement,
but it may well prove to be the case that it will be the organisations of the work-
ing poor, who make up the bulk of the world’s working population today, that 
provide the countervailing collective force necessary to subordinate markets once
again to the processes of social reproduction.  Until that happens, however, women
across the world will have to continue to make use of the more individualised
forms of power at their disposal to signal their discontent at society’s failure to
achieve a better integration between the processes of production and 
reproduction. 
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Appendix
Table A1 Trends in adult activity rates, during 1975–95, by percent-
age of countries with each type of change, total and by gender
Source: Standing (1999b: 587).
*Activity rates of man and women changed in the opposite directions, involving a fall in male and
a rise in female activity rates, so that they approximately offset each other. 
Table A2 Labour force participation rates by gender and the ratio of
economically active females per 100 males (2003 data) 
Taken from Table 2, p.4 (Elder and Schmidt 2004). 
Gender/type of change Developingcountries
Developed
countries
Women
Increased 74 70
Decreased 17 15
No change 9 15
Total 100 100
Men
Increased 26 5
Decreased 66 95
No change 9 0
Total 100 100
Total
Increased 52 35
Decreased 40 45
Compensated* 3 20
No Change 6 0
Total 100 100
Male LFPRs
(%)
Female LFPRs
(%)
Economically
active women
per 100 active
men
MENA 76.8 28.2 36
South Asia 81.1 37.4 44
LAC 80.5 49.2 64
South-East Asia 82.9 60.5 75
Sub-Saharan Africa 85.3 63.2 77
East Asia 85.1 73.1 83
World 79.4 53.9 68
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